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ABSTRACT
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Doctor of Philosophy
by Yan Zheng WEI
Recommender systems have been widely advocated as a way of coping with the problem
of information overload for knowledge workers. Given this, multiple recommendation
methods have been developed. However, it has been shown that no one technique is
best for all users in all situations. Thus, we believe that e®ective recommender systems
should incorporate a wide variety of such techniques and that some form of overarching
framework should be put in place to coordinate the various recommendations so that
only the best of them (from whatever source) are presented to the user. To this end,
we show that a marketplace, in which the various recommendation methods compete
to o®er their recommendations to the user, can be used in this role. Speci¯cally, our
research is concerned with the principled design of such a marketplace (including the
auction protocol, the reward mechanism and the bidding strategies of the individual
recommender agents) and its evaluation in terms of how it can e®ectively coordinate
multiple methods. In addition to the market mechanisms, a reinforcement learning
strategy is developed to assist the individual recommender agents' bidding behaviour
so as to learn the users' interests and still maximize their revenue. Finally, we evaluate
our approach with a real market-based recommender system that is composed of a
number of typical recommendation methods and that is evaluated with real users. The
evaluation results show that our approach is indeed an e®ective means of coordinating
multiple di®erent recommendation methods in one single system and is an e®ective way
of dealing with the problem of information overload.Contents
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viiiChapter 1
Introduction
The World-Wide Web (the Web) [Berners-Lee et al., 1992] presents us with a vast array of
information. Also, regardless of the metric used (i.e., growth in the number of networks,
hosts, users, or tra±c), the Internet is growing at least 10 percent per month and the
content of the Web grows by an estimated 170,000 pages daily [Turban et al., 2000]p495.
When taken together, these factors make it very hard to know what documents are
out there and ¯nding the right one is even more problematic. This phenomenon is
known as information overload: here de¯ned as the receipt of undesirable or non-relevant
information that results in an economic loss for the recipient [Losee, 1989].
To address this problem a range of tools to assist with indexing, retrieving and searching
techniques have been developed [Zamboni, 1998, Pinkerton, 2000, Howe and Dreilinger,
1997, Zuno, 1997]. However, the objective of e±ciently and e®ectively delivering the
right information, to the right people, at the right time, is still a fundamental research
challenge. To this end, the research described in this thesis attempts to address the
problem by designing, developing and evaluating an overarching system that incorpo-
rates and coordinates a number of di®erent recommendation methods to suggest recom-
mendations (section 1.1). In particular, a market-based approach is used to coordinate
the behaviour of the constituent methods that make recommendations using a variety of
techniques (section 1.2). By designing, simulating and implementing such a system, we
have advanced the state of the art in a number of important ways outline in section 1.3.
Finally, the whole document structure is listed in the end of the chapter (section 1.4).
1Chapter 1 Introduction 2
1.1 Overcoming Information Overload
The most widely used tool to assist with information overload is that of a search en-
gine. It provides a means of searching for existing information and it can exist in many
di®erent forms. For example, Lycos (http://www.lycos.com), one of the oldest search
engines among those available today [Zamboni, 1998], extracts keywords, title, the words
found in the ¯rst few lines of text, and the most frequently-occurring words in the rest
of the document to provide users with relevant documents. WebCrawler [Pinkerton,
2000] was the ¯rst comprehensive full-text search engine for the Web. It performs index
searching based on the document contents. But the number of processed documents
is limited [Zamboni, 1998]. SavvySearch [Howe and Dreilinger, 1997] is designed to
e±ciently query other search engines by carefully selecting those engines most likely
to return useful results and by responding to °uctuating load demands on the Web.
SavvySearch learns to identify which search engines are most appropriate for particular
queries, reasons about resource demands and represents an iterative parallel search strat-
egy as a simple plan. Vrisko [Zuno, 1997] is a personal knowledge manager client, which
provides facilities such as integrated searching over many search engines and relevance
(pertinence to the matter at hand) ranking of results. Vrisko allows users to specify a
context for the search. It also allows for user pro¯ling. The pro¯les are updated accord-
ing to user feedback and also automatically by search results. However, with all these
searching tools, the user has to consider the large number of sources available, decide
which one to access, and interact with each one individually. This is very tedious and
inconvenient to the user [Levy et al., 1996]. Moreover, although these tools provide a
means of searching for existing information, they lack a mechanism for informing the
user about new information related to their interests. When cooped with the explod-
ing volume of digital information, it is di±cult for a user who is only equipped with a
search capability to stay informed without sifting through huge amounts of incoming
information.
To overcome this problem, it is possible to exploit information ¯ltering techniques that
can help in this context [Loeb and Terry, 1992]. Information ¯ltering systems sort
through large volumes of continuously arriving textual information and present to theChapter 1 Introduction 3
user only those items that are likely to satisfy his1 (or her) interest [Belkin and Croft,
1992]. Many such tools are now available over the Internet. For example, the Stanford
Information Filtering Tool (SIFT) [Yan and Garcia-Molina, 1995] provides a service ca-
pable of directing information of users' interests to the subscribed users. It supports
full-text ¯ltering using well-known information retrieval models (such as boolean pro-
¯les, vector space and relevance feedback [Salton, 1989]). The SIFT ¯ltering engine
implements novel indexing techniques, capable of processing large volumes of informa-
tion against a large number of pro¯les. Agentware i3 [Autonomy, 1997] applies pattern
matching algorithms with contextual analysis in order to provide users with relevant
documents based on information about the users' interests. SIGMA uses ¯ltering agents
to learn the user's interests when they query Usenet news articles (a high-volume and
high-turnover discussion list service on the Internet) [Karakoulas and Ferguson, 1996].
However, in general, such tools still tend to have the weakness of either providing too
much irrelevant information or missing relevant information [Shardanand and Maes,
1995, Resnick and Varian, 1997].
To overcome the above mentioned limitations of ¯ltering, recommender systems have
been advocated. A recommender system is one that assists and augments the natu-
ral social process of making choices among recommendations from all kinds of sources
without su±cient personal experience of the alternatives [Resnick and Varian, 1997].
Thus, in this context, a recommendation is viewed as a reference to an item that will be
directed to the user who is looking for information. A typical recommender system ag-
gregates and directs recommendations to appropriate recipients. Given this view, it can
be seen that a recommender system's main value lies in information aggregation and its
ability to match the recommendations with people seeking information. It di®ers from
conventional ¯ltering systems in that recommendations are based upon subjective values
assigned by people, namely the quality of items, rather than more objective properties
(such as the text content of a document) of the items themselves [Resnick et al., 1994,
Shardanand and Maes, 1995]. Compared to a system that only has searching or other
simple information ¯ltering functionalities, recommender systems require less experience
on the part of the user and less e®ort to specify and restrain their interests when query-
ing and operating the system [Resnick and Varian, 1997]. This is because recommender
1\His" represents \his or her" throughout the thesis. Similarly, \he" and \him" represent \he or she"
and \him or her" respectively.Chapter 1 Introduction 4
systems provide their users with recommendations that have been recognized as good
(based on their previously expressed preferences or the preferences of other users with
similar interests). Given these bene¯ts, recommender systems have now been applied
in many application domains, including music albums [Shardanand and Maes, 1995],
video [Hill et al., 1995], Usenet news [Terveen et al., 1997, Resnick et al., 1994, Konstan
et al., 1997], and Web navigation [Kahle and Gilliat, 1997, El-Beltagy et al., 2001].
Against this background, this research is concerned with the problem of information
overload on the Web and how recommender systems can be used to help overcome this
problem. In particular, it deals with the \where to go next" problem by presenting
recommendations (represented as urls) that are relevant to the users' current browsing
context. This method is bene¯cial since users often ask questions such as \what else
should I read?" and \where do other people go from here?". By convention, such
recommendations are usually displayed in a separate window without interrupting a
user's current navigation (Figure 1.1 is an example of the system that we have built for
this task).
To date, two typical kinds of ¯ltering approaches are used to produce recommendations:
content-based and collaborative ¯ltering (see section 2.1 for more details). The former
makes recommendations by analyzing the similarity between the contents of the items
that are ready to be recommended and those that have previously been marked as
liked by the user. The latter makes recommendations by putting forward items that
have been deemed appropriate by people who have similar interests to the user. Based
on these two techniques, a large number of recommendation ¯ltering methods have
been developed (again see section 2.1 for more details). However, most conventional
recommender systems share two major weaknesses:
² Each recommender system typically embeds some speci¯c algorithm to compute
correlations (the similarity of two relevant objects). However, there is no univer-
sally best way of doing this (and nor do we believe that there will ever be such a
method). Rather, it is always the case that some methods are better in particular
conditions and others are better in other conditions [Breese et al., 1998]. Given
this, we believe the solution is to have a suite of recommendation methods available
and to have the system automatically detect which one is the most appropriateChapter 1 Introduction 6
open system2 that allows new methods to be added as and when they are developed
and which coordinates their outputs such that only the best recommendations (from
whatever source or method) are presented to the user [Wei et al., 2003b, To appearb].
Speci¯cally, we believe a market-based approach is an e±cient means of achieving such
coordination because the problem of selecting appropriate recommendations to display
in the sidebar space can be viewed as one of scarce resource allocation and markets are
an e±cient solution for this class of problems [Clearwater, 1996, Wellman and Wurman,
1998]. Moreover, the underlying economic theory provides an analytical framework for
predicting aggregate behaviour and designing individual information providers [Mullen
and Wellman, 1995]. Given this, this thesis is concerned with the systematic design
and evaluation of such a market-based recommender system (see section 2.5 for the
basics of market-based recommender systems). In particular, our system is capable of
recommending documents relevant to the users' current browsing context as a way of
dealing with the problem of information overload3.
1.2 A Market-Based Approach to Recommendation
Moreau et al. [2002] showed that multiple recommendation methods can be incorporated
into a single system, and that a marketplace is capable of coordinating multiple methods
to direct the most valuable Web documents to the user's browser. In this system,
each time a request for recommendations is made to the recommender system, a large
number of recommendations may be put forward. However, from the point of view of
the user, when seeking recommendations, it is ine®ective to have too many items put
forward. Moreover, the browser sidebar space is limited. Therefore, the question of how
to accommodate so many recommendations into the limited sidebar space is the main
concern.
2An open system is one in which the structure of the system itself is capable of dynamically chang-
ing [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998]. The characteristics of such a system are that its components
are not known in advance, can change over time, and may be highly heterogeneous (in that they are
implemented by di®erent people, at di®erent times, using di®erent software tools and techniques).
3In this work, we are not concerned with developing new recommendation methods. Our aim is
to e±ciently coordinate existing (and future) methods so that the overall system produces the best
information to the user. We do not compare the relative performance of the methods. Rather our
concern lies with the fact that di®erent methods make recommendations simultaneously and we let the
user decide which recommendations are good (irrespective of the speci¯c methods they are provided by).Chapter 1 Introduction 9
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Figure 1.4: The Black Box Coordinating Various Methods
view the quality di®erently; (ii) Correlating these di®erent qualities in a meaningful
manner. In more detail, given a recommendation provided by a recommender agent with
a speci¯c recommendation method, a user's valuation of the recommendation may di®er
from that of the recommender agent. For example, in Figure 1.3, a recommender agent
might highly rate a recommendation and therefore direct it to the user. However, the
user may see this as a poor quality recommendation that is not very interesting. Given
this situation, it is clear that the quality of a recommendation can be viewed from two
aspects. From the viewpoint of the user, how well a recommendation satis¯es the user
is termed the user perceived quality (upq). From the viewpoint of a recommender agent
with a speci¯c recommendation method, the relevance score it computes for a particular
recommendation is termed its internal quality (inq). Moreover, the inq value produced
by di®erent methods can vary signi¯cantly from one another. Therefore, without a
systematic means of relating the upq to the recommendation methods' inq, it is very
di±cult to provide high quality recommendations. In this research, the key challenge is to
design a reward mechanism (that re°ects the user's satisfaction of the recommendations)
so that the marketplace can correlate the upq and the inq.
In short, the key role of the marketplace developed in our system is to try and connect
these two quality values by imposing a reward regime that incentivises the recommender
agents to bid in a manner that establishes an appropriate correlation between these
values and their bid price. In this way, the marketplace can be viewed as a black box
with recommendations provided by di®erent recommender agents as the input and only
a few best recommendations passed through to the user as the output (see Figure 1.4).Chapter 1 Introduction 10
In sum, the thesis designs and evaluates the market-based mechanism as a means of co-
ordinating recommendations4. Through experiments and evaluations, we demonstrate
that the market-based approach to recommender systems is an e®ective means of coor-
dinating multiple di®erent recommendation methods in one single system and that it is
an e®ective way of dealing with the problem of information overload by selecting only
the best items from whatever methods to be displayed to users. Speci¯cally, it is not an
information ¯ltering technique, nor a hybrid recommender system, but a novel approach
to making recommendations.
1.3 Research Contributions
The work described in this thesis advances the state of the art in the following ways:
(1) The market-based approach to recommender systems provides a novel method for
e®ectively coordinating the behaviour of multiple recommendation methods with
diverse measures of inq. The market-based design exhibits the following properties:
² The analytical studies demonstrate that the bespoke marketplace we have de-
signed is Pareto-optimal, maximizes social welfare and is individually rational.
² The empirical studies demonstrate that the market always converges, shortlists
recommendations in decreasing order of upq, gives clear incentives and is fair
to all constituent recommender agents, and is stable.
² The user studies demonstrate that the marketplace is an e®ective means of
coordinating multiple di®erent recommendation methods and the system is
able to identify the best recommendations from the user's perspective and can
suggest them frequently to users.
(2) We di®erentiate the quality of recommendations by two types of measurement: the
upq and the inq. No other recommender system uses upq or provides a mechanism
for correlating inq and upq.
4The credits paid by recommender agents for advertising their recommendations and the rewards
awarded to agents to encourage them to put forward good suggestions are not a real currency. Thus,
there is not a business model concerned with these credits and rewards, they are used only for the
coordination of the recommender agents in our system.Chapter 1 Introduction 11
(3) A novel reinforcement learning strategy is developed to assist recommender agents'
bidding so that they can best satisfy the users while still maximizing their revenue.
These contributions have been published in the following papers:
² Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Learning Users' Interests
by Quality Classi¯cation in Market-Based Recommender Systems. IEEE Trans-
actions on Knowledge and Data Engineering. To appear. This paper supports the
above contribution point (3).
² Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. A Market-Based Ap-
proach to Recommender Systems. ACM Transactions on Information Systems.
To appear. This paper supports the above contribution points (1 & 2).
² Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Learning users' interests in
a market-based recommender system. In Proc. of the 5th International Conference
on Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning (IDEAL'04), pages 833{
840, Exeter, UK, 2004a. Springer LNCS 3177. This paper supports the above
contribution point (3).
² Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Market-based recom-
mender systems: Learning users' interests by quality classi¯cation. In Proc. of the
6th International Workshop on Agent-Oriented Information Systems (AOIS-2004),
pages 119{133, New York, US, 2004b. This paper supports the above contribution
point (3).
² Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Market-based recom-
mendations: Design, simulation and evaluation. In Proc. of the 5th Interna-
tional Workshop on Agent-Oriented Information Systems (AOIS-2003), pages 63{
78, Melbourne, Australia, 2003a. Springer LNAI 3030. This paper supports the
above contribution points (1 & 2).
² Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Recommender systems:
A market-based design. In Proc. of the 2nd International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS03), pages 600{607, Mel-
bourne, Australia, 2003b. ACM Press. This paper supports the above contribution
points (1 & 2).Chapter 1 Introduction 12
² Luc Moreau, Norliza Zaini, Jing Zhou, Nicholas R. Jennings, Yan Zheng Wei,
Wendy Hall, David De Roure, Ian Gilchrist, Mark O'Dell, Sigi Reich, Tobias Berka,
and Claudia Di Napoli. A market-based recommender system. In Proc. of the
4th International Workshop on Agent-Oriented Information Systems (AOIS-2002),
pages 50{67, Bologna, July 2002. This paper supports the above contribution point
(1).
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of the document is structured in the following manner:
Chapter 2 presents a literature review on recommender systems, online auctions, and
market-based recommender systems. This chapter provides a detailed discussion of these
terms, and will discuss what others have done in these areas.
Chapter 3 presents the detailed design of the main components of our market-based
recommender system. It deals with the evaluation techniques, auction protocol, reward
mechanism, bidding strategy, and a discussion of the market equilibrium.
Chapter 4 establishes the experimental settings of the reward agent, the recommender
agents and the user agent to simulate the marketplace empirically. This chapter then
empirically evaluates the system design by simulations of the marketplace equipped with
multiple recommendation methods.
Chapter 5 presents a recommender agent's problem of learning users' interests in terms
of correlating the inqs to the upqs of its recommendations in our marketplace, develops
the strategy we build for the recommender agents, and evaluates the learning strategy.
Chapter 6 presents the user evaluation of our market-based approach to recommender
systems. Speci¯cally, this chapter sets out a number of evaluation metrics, presents a
typical user trial of our system, con¯gures the marketplace and three recommendation
methods, and evaluates the system using a number of real users against the metrics we
set up.
Chapter 7 draws some conclusions on the system design and presents the plan for future
work.Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter reviews the state of the art in conventional recommender systems (sec-
tion 2.1) and agent-oriented approaches to recommender systems (section 2.2), outlines
the fundamental principles and concepts of auction theory (section 2.4), outlines existing
work on market-based recommender systems (section 2.5) and presents some basics of
reinforcement learning (section 2.6).
2.1 Recommender Systems
To date, a large number of recommendation techniques have been developed. These are,
however, based mainly on three kinds of ¯ltering techniques: content-based, collaborative
and demographic (although there is also some work on hybrid ¯ltering techniques). Each
of these categories will be discussed in turn in this section.
2.1.1 Content-Based Filtering
Conventional techniques to deal with information overload typically exploit content-
based ¯ltering techniques. Such ¯ltering techniques recommend items for the user based
on the descriptions of previously evaluated items. They have been widely used in mak-
ing recommendations of information items. For example, Syskill recommends Web docu-
ments based on users' binary ratings (\hot" and \cold") of their interests [Pazzani et al.,
1996] and Newsweeder helps users ¯lter Usenet news articles by learning the user's pro¯le
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based on his ratings [Lang, 1995]. Generally speaking, however, content-based ¯ltering
approaches have a number of weaknesses in recommending good items:
² A user's selection is often based on the subjective attributes (such as the quality,
style or point-of-view of items) of the item [Goldberg et al., 1992], whereas content-
based approaches are based on objective attributes (such as the text content of
a document) about the items and do not take the user's perceived valuation of
such subjective attributes into account [Montaner et al., 2003]. For example, these
methods cannot distinguish between a well written and a badly written article if
both happen to use the same terms.
² Either the items must be of some machine parsable form (e.g. text), or attributes
must have been assigned to them by hand [Shardanand and Maes, 1995]. With
current technology, media such as sound, photographs, art, video or physical items
cannot be analyzed automatically for relevant attribute information. Moreover, in
most cases, it is not practical or possible to assign these attributes by hand due to
limitations of resources.
² The techniques do not have an inherent method for generating serendipitous
¯nds [Shardanand and Maes, 1995]. They tend to recommend more of what a
user has already seen. This is because content-based methods compare potential
items with items that the user has already seen. However, the user's interests may
beyond the scope of the previously seen items. Thus, such interesting items can
hardly be recommended to the user.
2.1.2 Collaborative Filtering
A complementary technique that is also widely used is collaborative ¯ltering [Goldberg
et al., 1992] (or social ¯ltering [Shardanand and Maes, 1995]). The basic idea of col-
laborative ¯ltering is people recommending items to one another [Terveen et al., 1997].
Collaborative ¯ltering essentially automates the process of \word-of-mouth" recommen-
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with similar interests. The system determines which users have similar interests via stan-
dard formulas for computing statistical correlations (e.g., ratings on items of their inter-
ests) [Goldberg et al., 1992]. Collaborative ¯ltering overcomes some of the limitations of
content-based ¯ltering in that the items being ¯ltered need not be amenable to parsing
by a computer. Moreover, recommendations are based on the users' perceived quality of
items, rather than more objective properties of the items themselves [Shardanand and
Maes, 1995].
In more detail, collaborative ¯ltering techniques match people with similar interests and
then recommend one person's highly evaluated items to the others [Goldberg et al., 1992,
Resnick et al., 1994]. Thus, rather than computing the similarity of items (which relies
on machine analysis of content [Herlocker et al., 2000]), collaborative ¯ltering computes
the similarity of user's interests. This means that subjective data about items can be
incorporated into recommendations. This, in turn, facilitates serendipitous new ¯nds
because interesting items from other users can extend the current user's scope of inter-
est beyond his already seen items. In addition, collaborative ¯ltering techniques can be
used to recommend both machine parsable items (such as textual articles [Terveen et al.,
1997]) and non-machine parsable ones (such as audio and video ¯les [Shardanand and
Maes, 1995, Hill et al., 1995]). Indeed, perhaps the greatest strength of collaborative
techniques is that they are completely independent of any machine-readable representa-
tions of the objects being recommended. Thus, they work well for complex objects such
as music and movies where variations in taste are responsible for much of the variation
in preference [Burke, 2002].
Collaborative ¯ltering techniques have been widely used in many application domains
(not only textual documents but also non machine-parsable media products). For ex-
ample, GroupLens is a system for collaborative ¯ltering of Usenet news to help people
¯nd articles they will like in the huge stream of available articles [Resnick et al., 1994,
Konstan et al., 1997]. The system displays predicted scores (i.e. inqs) for the items
suggested to its users and the users give their ratings (i.e. upqs) to the articles after
they read them. The system predicts items' scores based on the heuristic that people
who agreed in the past will probably agree in the future with people who have similar in-
terests. Based on similar techniques of predicting scores of items, MovieLens is a system
for personalized recommendations for movies [Miller et al., 2003] and Ringo for musicChapter 2 Literature Review 16
albums [Shardanand and Maes, 1995]. However, collaborative ¯ltering recommender
systems can do more than ¯nding information items for people. They can even assist
people to ¯nd other people (rather than documents) with similar interests. MEMOIR
is such an example [DeRoure et al., 2001].
However, collaborative ¯ltering approaches also have a number of shortcomings:
² Large numbers of people must participate so as to increase the likelihood that any
one person will ¯nd other users with similar interests [Terveen and Hill, 2001] (the
sparsity problem). The di±culty of achieving a critical mass of participants makes
collaborative ¯ltering experiments expensive.
² A user whose interests share little with others' will receive poor recommendations
on a collaborative basis. An extreme case of this phenomenon happens when new
users start o® with nothing in their pro¯les of interests and must train a pro¯le
from scratch (the \cold start problem" [Resnick and Varian, 1997]). Even with a
start pro¯le, there is still a training period before the pro¯le accurately re°ects
the user's preferences [Maltz and Ehrlich, 1995].
² These systems su®er from the \early-rater problem" [Montaner et al., 2003]: when
a new item appears in the database, there is no way it can be recommended to
a user until more information is obtained through another user either rating it or
specifying which other items it is similar to.
2.1.3 Demographic Filtering
The demographic approach uses descriptions of people (such as occupation, age and
gender) to learn the relationship between a single item and the type of people who like
it [Krulwich, 1997]. For example, a mature, sophisticated woman is likely to prefer
an expensive leather jacket, whereas a teenage schoolgirl may prefer a cheap denim
one. To date, there is only one widely recognized system, LifeStyle, that uses such a
technique [Krulwich, 1997].
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² It creates pro¯les by classifying users using stereotypical descriptions [Rich, 1979].
Thus, the same items are recommended to people with similar demographic pro-
¯les. However, in many cases, the stereotypes are too general to generate good
quality recommendations [Montaner et al., 2003].
² If the user's interests shift over time, demographic ¯ltering does not adapt their
pro¯le [Koychev, 2000]. For these reasons, demographic ¯ltering is rarely used
independently of the other ¯ltering techniques.
2.1.4 Hybrid Approaches
As can be seen, both content-based and collaborative ¯ltering have weaknesses. More-
over, these weaknesses tend to complement one another [Montaner et al., 2003]. Thus,
hybrid ¯ltering systems that integrate the two approaches have been advocated [Her-
locker et al., 2000]. In a hybrid system, both objective and subjective properties of
an item are taken into account in predicting its quality when making recommenda-
tions. For example, \collaboration via contents" ¯lterbots integrate content-based ¯l-
tering techniques to build virtual users in the GroupLens collaborative system when new
recommendation items lack ratings [Sarwar et al., 1998], the Fab collaborative system
maintains user pro¯les by using content-based analysis [Balabanovic and Shoham, 1997],
Pazzani's system involves user collaborations to determine the ratings of predicted items
and a content-based pro¯le to compute similarity among users [Pazzani, 1999], Popes-
cul's system uses secondary data (e.g. document contents) to predict users' preferences
in collaborative recommendations when there is a lack of user ratings [Popescul et al.,
2001], and Claypoole's system employs separate collaborative and content-based recom-
menders and uses an adaptive weighted average of the two in making its selections (as
the number of users accessing an item increases, the weight of the collaborative compo-
nent tends to increase [Claypool et al., 1999]). In addition, many business systems use
a hybrid ¯ltering approach to recommend their products and services, such as Amazon
(http://www.amazon.com) and CDnow (http://www.cdnow.com).
While hybrid systems can sometimes overcome the shortcomings of pure content-based
and pure collaborative systems, with respect to the objective and subjective properties
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such systems try to use one of the recommendation properties (either objectiveness or
subjectiveness) to complement the weaknesses of the other when the latter does not work
e®ectively. However, there is no automated way of determining in what circumstances
which kind of properties (objective, subjective or both) are relevant to a particular user
in their current context.
2.1.5 Conclusion
Having an understanding of the basics of the di®erent ¯ltering techniques used in rec-
ommender systems, we can see that there is no universally best ¯ltering technique for
all kinds of users in all various situations. Therefore, a bespoke mechanism that incor-
porates multiple techniques and lets only the best items pass through is needed. The
related work in terms of incorporating and coordinating multiple recommendation meth-
ods is discussed in section 2.5. However, before we do this, we discuss the agent-oriented
approach to recommender systems.
2.2 Agent-Oriented Recommender Systems
As exempli¯ed above, many recommendation methods have been developed and it is
likely that many more will become available in the future. Moreover, we can see that
many recommender systems incorporate various techniques to assist recommendations
and interactions among various entities in a system. In this way, such systems will be-
come very complex. For these reasons, from the point of view of software engineering,
there is a need to maintain the system architecture so that it can work e±ciently, when
new components and more interactions amongst them become available [Jennings, 2001].
Additionally, many existing recommender systems are personalized to make the recom-
mendations more e®ective to the users [Shardanand and Maes, 1995, Baclace, 1991,
Sheth and Maes, 1993, Lieberman, 1995]. This is because, on the one hand, people's in-
terests di®er from one another, as well as their behaviour against the recommendations.
On the other hand, the recommender can serve a user more e®ectively by learning his
interests. To this end, agents are an e®ective conceptual model for various components
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To be more speci¯c, here, an agent can be viewed as a computer system situated in
some environment, that is capable of autonomous actions in that environment in order
to meet its design objectives [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]. Agents have a variety of
characteristics that make them an appropriate solution for complex systems in general:
(i) They are capable of dealing with the dynamically changing characteristics of open
systems. (ii) They represent a powerful tool for making complex, large or unpredictable
systems modular [Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998]. In this way, the overall problem can
be partitioned into a number of smaller and simpler components, which are easier to
develop and maintain. (iii) They assist with the human computer interaction because
they can be personalized to their owner. Agents can thus act as \expert assistants" with
respect to some application, embodying knowledge about both the application and the
users, and capable of assisting the users to achieve their goals [Jennings and Wooldridge,
1998].
In addition to these general reasons, we believe an agent-oriented approach is suitable
in this particular context, because:
1. Users can naturally be represented in the system by user agents [Maes, 1994] that
act autonomously on their behalf, ¯nding information relevant to them, but also
observing their activities, so that the system can tailor its answers to their needs.
2. Information sources can naturally be represented as active agents whose objective
is to ensure their content is widely disseminated to appropriate users.
3. The open nature of a recommender system means the software components need
to interact in °exible ways and that such interactions cannot be hand-crafted at
design time.
These bene¯ts have been recognized by a number of researchers and this has led to the
development of a number of agent-based recommender systems. Relevant examples of
such systems include:
² Fab combined content-based and collaborative ¯ltering techniques to recommend
items [Balabanovic and Shoham, 1997]. It is a hybrid system that seeks to incor-
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index Web documents, and for pro¯ling group interests. They enable the system
to automatically identify emergent communities of interest in the user population,
which enables enhanced group awareness and communications.
² MEMOIR uses trails, open hypermedia link services and a set of software agents
to assist users in accessing and navigating vast amounts of information in Internet
environments [DeRoure et al., 2001]. Additionally, it exploits trail data to support
users in ¯nding colleagues with similar interests, since users with similar interests
follow similar paths and therefore they leave comparable trails. MEMOIR di®ers
from previous systems in that it aims to ¯nd users rather than documents.
² Linking in Context provides a service that automatically recommends relevant Web
document links to the user's current context, such that the user does not need to
consult any external search facilities [El-Beltagy et al., 2001]. In more detail, the
system coordinates di®erent types of agents to extract document context, and
generates and categorizes links into clusters according to di®erent users' interests.
When new types of users' interests become available, new link clusters are added
into the system.
2.3 Improving the Quality of Recommendations
Although both agent and non-agent based recommender systems have a number of ad-
vantages in comparison to pure ¯ltering systems, most of them still su®er from problems
related to quality of recommendations. These include:
² The quality of the recommendations with respect to the user's preferences needs
to be improved [Sarwar et al., 2000]. Users need recommendations they can trust
to help them ¯nd what they like. If the recommendations provided by the recom-
mender system are poor, then the system will not be used.
² It is di±cult to match the various recommendation methods' inq to the upq. This
is because the inq is based on a recommendation method's internal valuation of
a recommendation, while the upq is based on the user's valuation of it. And, as
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² There is not a universal criterion to evaluate which methods are better than the
others. Therefore, there is not a universally best recommendation method that
can always suggest the best recommendations in all circumstances. Moreover, it is
di±cult to compare and evaluate the di®erent methods that are available [Breese
et al., 1998]. This is due to the fact that di®erent recommendation methods are
based on di®erent notions. For example, some are based on the correlation between
the item contents (such as term frequency inverse document frequency [Salton and
McGill, 1983] and weighting [El-Beltagy et al., 2001]), while others are based on
the correlation between users' interests (such as votes [Goldberg et al., 1992] and
trails [DeRoure et al., 2001]).
A number of recommenders have tried to address these research challenges. Speci¯cally,
Yu et al. [2001] introduced an information theoretic approach to measure the relevance
of a user for predicting the preference for the given target concept. The learning ap-
proach [Sheth and Maes, 1993, Baclace, 1991, Billsus and Pazzani, 1998] to personalized
information ¯ltering using relevance feedback and genetic algorithms also helps in the
context of improving the quality of recommendations. Finally, Sheth [Sheth and Maes,
1993] has demonstrated a system with a collection of information ¯ltering interface
agents which has learning capabilities of specializing users' interests and exploring new
potential domains to predict the users' preferences so as to provide good recommen-
dations. Now all these approaches make it possible to provide good recommendations
from the viewpoint of one speci¯c recommendation method itself. However, they are
still weak in improving the quality from the user's point of view. Additionally, they
still lack a regime that can seek the best recommendations across a number of di®erent
methods in a single system. Therefore, these approaches are still some distance away
from meeting the objective of suggesting the best recommendations in all possible cir-
cumstances. In contrast, we believe that the best way of dealing with this problem is
to allow multiple recommendation methods to co-exist and to provide an overarching
system that coordinates their outputs such that only the best recommendations (from
whatever source or method) are presented to the user. To make this a reality, however,
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1. Given multiple recommendation methods, it is comparatively easy to provide the
user with a multitude of recommendations. However, the challenge is to ¯lter
them to the user in a decreasing order of upq, given that there is no comparability
among di®erent methods' inqs. Moreover, another di±culty is that the notion of
quality is not absolute, but rather it is user-de¯ned and varies over time, typically
according to the user's interests and activities.
2. Many methods for suggesting relevant information already exist and more will
be developed in the future. Some may be specialized to speci¯c media such as
audio or video [Hill et al., 1995]; others may be particularly suited to process
information in text documents [Maltz, 1993]; while yet others are more e±cient in
speci¯c application domains [DeRoure et al., 2001]. From an architectural point
of view, this means the challenge is to design a modular system that has the
ability to accommodate multiple recommending methods, and to integrate them
in a seamless and dynamic fashion as they appear on line.
As outlined in section 1.2, the means we have chosen to manage the multiple recom-
menders in a marketplace. To this end, section 2.4 explains the basic concepts of auctions
in more detail.
2.4 Auction Theory
Auctions are an e±cient and e®ective market mechanism. They are important in our
research because they are an e±cient means of allocating scarce resource. Moreover, the
underlying economic theories are well-studied [Klemperer, 1999, Vickrey, 1961, Milgrom
and Weber, 1982, McAfee and McMillan, 1987, Milgrom, 1989] and are suitable for
modeling various market participants in experiments. In this context, we are not going to
provide a detailed survey on auction theory (see [Klemperer, 1999] for such information).
Instead, we report on the issues related to agent-mediated on-line auctions that are
relevant to our context.
In designing an auction mechanism, two key issues are essential: the protocol and the
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Formally, a protocol is a set of norms that constrain the proposals that the auction
participants are able to make [Jennings et al., 2001]. To date, thousands of di®erent
auction protocols have been devised [Wellman et al., 2001]. However, four standard
auctions are widely used and analyzed: the ascending auction (also called the English
auction), the descending auction (also called the Dutch auction), the ¯rst-price sealed-
bid auction (sometimes called the Yankee auction), and the second-price sealed-bid
auction (also called the Vickrey auction).
In the ascending auctions, the price is successively raised until only one bidder remains,
and that bidder wins the object at the ¯nal price. This auction can be run by having
the seller announce prices, by having the bidders call out prices themselves, or by having
bids submitted electronically with the best current bid posted. The descending auction
works in exactly the opposite way: the auctioneer starts at a very high price, and then
lowers it continuously. The ¯rst bidder that calls out to accept the current price wins
the good at that price.
In the ¯rst-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder independently submits a single bid,
without seeing others' bids, and the good is sold to the bidder who makes the highest
bid. The winner pays his bid. In the second-price sealed-bid auction, everything is the
same as in the ¯rst-price sealed bid auction except that the good is sold to the bidder
who makes the highest bid, but at a price of the second-highest bidder's bid.
In all of these cases, if there is more than one item to be sold, the items can all be sold
at the same price (called price uniformity) or they may be sold at di®erent prices (called
price di®erentiation). In this work, we consider auctions with price di®erentiation since
these allow a seller to obtain the maximum possible pro¯t [Varian, 2003] p434-436 (refer
to section 3.2 for more details).
Given a speci¯c auction protocol, a bidder's strategy is the decision making model that
they use in order to decide what actions to take [Jennings et al., 2001]. For example, a
bidder's best strategy, irrespective of others', in an English auction is to bid actively until
the price reaches the value of the good to him [Milgrom and Weber, 1982]. As another
example, a bidder's best strategy in a second-price sealed-bid auction is to submit a bid
equal to the value of the good to him [Milgrom and Weber, 1982]. Generally speaking,Chapter 2 Literature Review 24
however, for most auction protocols the strategy is not so simple and signi¯cant work
needs to be invested in order to design it.
To date, however, comparatively little work has been done on using auction-based tech-
niques to implement recommender systems. The reason for this is that recommender
systems have typically not incorporated multiple recommendation methods. Thus there
is no need for a coordination mechanism. There are, however, two systems that have
exploited this approach and these are discussed in section 2.5.
2.5 Market-Based Recommender Systems
Bohte et al. [2001] developed a system that used a competitive market-based allocation
of consumer attention space from the user's perspective. In the marketplace, supplier
agents compete with each other to attract the user's attention. The system uses an
(n + 1) auction, in which all winners pay the (n + 1)th price (i.e. there is no price
di®erentiation) and n is the number of items for competition. This work investigates
the user's behaviour in making choices when faced multiple items. Three user models are
demonstrated: 1. independent visits with several purchases, 2. independent visits with
one expected purchase, and 3. search-till-found behaviour. According to [Bohte et al.,
2001], model 1 shows very e±cient allocation of recommendations, whereas in models
2 and 3 e±cient allocation is di±cult to obtain. This is because the recommendation
provider's expected payo® is dependent on the allocation of the other recommendations.
In this work, we believe the user's behaviour models when making decisions in the face
of a list of recommendations are worth following (see section 4.1.3). However, this work
has a number of limitations when it comes to being used in a recommender system
context:
² This work is not concerned with the upq. Therefore, the recommenders cannot
readily learn the user's actual interests.
² The auction protocol requires all recommender agents to pay identically for di®er-
ent selected items and comparatively little information is conveyed by the system
(primarily a signal of selection). With only identical information of di®erent se-
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neither can the recommender agents. Thus, the recommender agents cannot learn
to improve the quality of their recommendations according to a user's interest.
² This work is not targeted speci¯cally at recommendations, but rather at the al-
location of consumer's attention space. In other words, this work concerns the
user's behaviour when facing a list of recommendations rather than producing
high quality recommendations.
The second piece of work in this vein was our initial attempt at coordinating multiple
recommendation methods in a single system as detailed in [Moreau et al., 2002]. In
this work, an extensible modular recommender system suggesting relevant Web docu-
ments to the user's context is developed. The system is capable of integrating multiple
recommendation methods. Moreover, a marketplace is developed in the system to co-
ordinate various methods in making recommendations. The system also exhibited the
e±cient capability of incorporating multiple recommendation methods in a single system
in a seamless manner. However, without modelling the user, the marketplace fails to
meet the objective of making high quality recommendations with respect to the user's
interests:
² Without investigating the user's valuation of the recommendations (the upq), the
recommendations provided by various methods based on their individual valuation
of the items (the inq) are blindly made to the user (because the methods do not
know whether the user likes the recommendations). Moreover, without de¯ning
the upq, the system fails to incentivise recommending agents about the user's
interests. And the system has di±culty in knowing which recommendations are
better given a user's context. Therefore, it is di±cult to present the user with a
list of recommendations in decreasing order of the user perceived quality.
² The marketplace is not economically e±cient because of the way it limited the
rewards. More speci¯cally, there is only one recommendation rewarded in each
auction. The rewarded item is always the ¯rst bid which is predicted to be the
best. However, a real user may not select the ¯rst bid item. Moreover, he may
select multiple recommendations in one auction in the real circumstances. Thus,
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learn the user's interests in each auction. Therefore, one reward regime limited
the system learning capability of the user's interests. Moreover, the amount of
each reward is based on the other agents' bids. In this way, the reward and the
bidding price are based upon each other. Thus, the reward is in no way related
to the user's valuation of a recommendation and therefore cannot incentivise the
agents about the user's interests. In an e±cient market, the reward and the price
should indicate the value and cost of a good so as to incentivise the agents how
the user values an item and how much to bid on it.
² The system cannot stop bad recommendations. This is because the reward regime
is not based on the upq of the recommendations. Thus, bad recommendations can
also bid to a suitable level to be shortlisted and rewarded continuously. However,
we expect a good marketplace to have the capability to encourage good recom-
mendations and discourage bad ones.
Against this background, none of the standard auction protocols are suitable to regulate
our marketplace. This is because:
² Usually, there is only one bidder who wins in the standard auction protocols.
However, there may be more than one bidder (the recommender agents) who wins
in our auction.
² In the standard auction protocols, there is no notion of reward. However, in our
auction, the system will reward the winners for making good recommendations.
Therefore, we need to develop a bespoke auction protocol, including a reward mechanism,
to regulate the agents in our marketplace. With such an auction protocol, we also need
to design a bespoke strategy for the agents. And these will be discussed in detail in
Chapter 3.
2.6 Reinforcement Learning
In terms of suggesting good recommendations, an agent in our system needs to classify
its recommendations into di®erent inq categories and correlate these categories to theChapter 2 Literature Review 27
user's preferences. This is because, by frequently suggesting items from those categories
that best satisfy the users, a self-interested agent is able to maximize its revenue. To
do this, an agent needs to make trials over these categories and see which make pro¯ts
(by receiving rewards) and which lose credits (by paying for the bid, while not receiving
rewards). Now this kind of \trial-and-error" learning behaviour is exactly what happens
in Reinforcement Learning [Mitchell, 1997].
Generally speaking, in reinforcement learning, an agent is assumed to be situated in a
multi-state environment where the agent's actions determine both its immediate reward
and the next state of the environment. Moreover, this state transition a®ects the agent's
future actions and, consequently, its future expected rewards. Thus, the expected future
reward needs to be factored into the agent's current decision making. Therefore, in this
kind of problem, an agent needs to learn which actions are desirable based on rewards
that can be obtained arbitrarily far in the future. In this context, Markov Decision
Processes (MDPs) are a typical model of this kind of reinforcement learning [Mitchell,
1997]. An MDP consists of a set of states (s), a set of actions (a), a state transition
function (±(st;at) = st+1) and a reward function with respect to the transitions (r =
(st;at)). The MDP model makes the complicated decision making processes intuitive and
simpli¯ed by estimating the overall payo® (current reward plus the discounted delayed
rewards in future) of all the possible state transitions (all combinations of the state-
action pair (si;aj)). After this estimation pro¯le converges, an agent's optimal action
selection strategy is choosing the action with the maximal overall payo® at any given
state. However, in the context of our market-based recommender's learning, taking one
action is independent of taking another (because future rewards are only based on future
recommendations' upqs and have no relationship to the current recommendation) (see
details in section 5.2.1). In other words, the learning strategy we need does not have the
concept of states and state transition. It considers the actions and their corresponding
rewards only.
The most relevant work to our context in terms of reinforcement learning is the k-armed
gambling problem [Berry and Fristedt, 1985]. In the k-armed gambling problem, an
agent faces k gambling machines, each of which has a payo® probability of zero or one.
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machine (or from each inq segment in our case) as quickly as possible, while still maxi-
mizing its revenue. In this context, the solution to the k-armed gambling problem also
suits our problem. Speci¯cally, Berry and Fristedt developed a recursive algorithm to
¯nd the optimal strategy to gain the maximal payo®s in the case that the agent is per-
mitted a ¯xed number of pulls [Berry and Fristedt, 1985]. However, in our context, the
recommender agents do not have a limit on the number of interactions they can have
with the marketplace. Thus, we aim to develop an unbiased optimal strategy by allowing
the agents to gain su±cient experience. Gittins also tackles the k-armed gambling prob-
lem [Gittins, 1989]. His \allocation index" method indexes all the actions that an agent
experienced with a combined value of the expected payo® of each action and the value of
the information that can be obtained by choosing it. The agent then chooses the action
with the largest index value and this is shown to guarantee the optimal balance between
exploration and exploitation. However, this technique only applies if the expected future
rewards are discounted, which is inappropriate in our context because future rewards are
equally important as the current ones in our system (thus we do not discount rewards).
Thrun also develops an exploration strategy for the k-armed gambling problem [Thrun,
1992]. Speci¯cally, his strategy always chooses the action with the highest payo®. How-
ever, this strategy may produce a biased estimation from the true expectation, since the
actions with negative signals received in the beginning may have insu±cient experience
to produce biased expectations (as we discuss in section 5.2.3). In contrast, we aim to
build a strategy that can produce an unbiased expectation. Kaelbling's interval-based
technique can be seen as an extension of Thrun's greedy strategy [Kaelbling, 1993]. Her
approach computes the upper bound of the con¯dence interval on the success probabil-
ities of all actions and chooses the one with the highest upper bound. However, this
approach relies on an a priori analysis of the payo® distribution of each action. This
approach also has the shortcoming that insu±cient experience in the beginning of learn-
ing may produce biased con¯dence intervals and this, in turn, also induces a bias from
optimum.
In sum, none of the above learning strategies is suitable for the recommender agents in
our marketplace. Therefore, a speci¯c strategy needs to be developed for our context,
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2.7 Summary
We believe that with the growing number of recommendation methods and in the face
of evolving users' interests, there is a need to develop a mechanism capable of accommo-
dating multiple recommendation methods (both existing and forthcoming) and let them
work together to provide high quality recommendations. In this context, agent-mediated
online auctions appear to be a promising method for coordinating such system. Thus,
the key challenge of this research is to develop the market mechanisms that have the
capability to incentivise various recommending agents to bid according to the user's
valuation of their recommendations such that only a small number of the most valuable
items will be directed to the user. Additionally, a good learning strategy for recom-
menders to learn users' interests so that they can make good recommendations while
still maximize their revenue is another research challenge.Chapter 3
Auction Mechanism Design for
the Recommender System
This chapter discusses the design of the auction for our recommender system. In this
endeavor, there are two major issues that need to be addressed: the protocol and the
strategies (as detailed in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).
This chapter contributes to the thesis with the auction mechanism being designed. The
mechanism we developed for our system is theoretically proved to be able to give incen-
tives of users' interests to recommender agents by rewarding the user-selected recom-
mendations. A reward mechanism is also developed to incentivise recommender agents
about the users' interests. The mechanism follows the principle of good recommen-
dations making positive revenue by receiving rewards, whereas bad recommendations
make a loss by paying to be shortlisted but not receiving any rewards. Additionally, the
reward mechanism we developed is Pareto optimal and maximizes social welfare. With
the auction protocol and reward mechanism in place, a set of rational bidding strategies
are also developed for agents to make their recommendations. Finally, we theoretically
proved that the marketplace is able to dynamically reach the equilibria. And at the
equilibria, we show the recommender agents are able to reason about the relationship
between the bidding prices and the rewards so as to maximize their revenue.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the auction protocol (section 3.2) and reward
mechanism design (section 3.3), the agents' bidding strategies (section 3.4), as well as
a theoretical analysis on how the marketplace works to relate the agents' bids to their
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choose a ¯rst price auction with price di®erentiation because the relative ordering of the
recommendations a®ects the likelihood of them being selected by the user. In particular,
in the market, each information provider agent is keen to get their recommendations
advertised to the user. Each agent has a valuation of the advertisement (which will
be di®erent between the di®erent agents) and is willing to pay up to this amount to
display its recommendations. When an agent gets its recommendations short-listed,
and therefore advertised to the user's browser, it has consumed the advertisement service
provided by the recommender system. In return, it needs to pay an amount of credit to
the system.
In more detail, the market operates in the following manner. Each time when an auc-
tion is activated, the user requests recommendations of Web documents. In each such
activation, the auctioneer agent calls for a number of bids, say M (M > 0) equal to the
number of recommendations it is seeking. Then, each constituent recommender agent
submits M bids to the auctioneer agent (each bid contains a recommendation and a
price). After a ¯xed time, the auctioneer agent ranks all the bids it received by their
bidding price, and directs the M bids with the highest prices to the user's browser (as
recommendations in the sidebar | see Figure 1.1). Those bidding agents whose recom-
mendations are shortlisted pay the auctioneer agent according to how much they bid.
Those bidding agents whose recommendations are not shortlisted do not pay anything.
The user may then take up a number of these shortlisted recommendations in which
case the agent that supplied them is rewarded.
The protocol for each auction round is formally de¯ned in Figure 3.1. It should be
noted that: (i) function GenerateBid (Abi;recj;pricej) relates to the bidding strategy
and will be discussed in section 3.4; (ii) function UserSelectsRecs(SU) concerns the
user's behaviour of making choices among the shortlisted recommendations and will be
discussed in section 4.1.3; and (iii) function ComputeReward(bh) concerns the reward
mechanism and will be discussed in section 3.3.
3.3 The Reward Mechanism
With the auction protocol in place, we now turn to the reward mechanism. According
to our protocol, the user may select multiple recommendations from the shortlist. ForChapter 3 Auction Mechanism Design for the Recommender System 35
The Variables:
² S: the number of recommender agents (S > 1);
² Ab1;Ab2;:::;AbS: S bidding agents;
² AB: complete set of bidding agents, i.e., Ab1;Ab2;:::;AbS;
² Tb: duration of the auction;
² M: number of recommendations that the auctioneer agent requests;
² bij = hAbi;recj;priceji: bid provided by Abi, containing the j
th recommendation with
bidding price pricej (i 2 [1::S];j 2 [1::M]);
² B
ALL: a set of bids which represents all bids submitted to the auctioneer agent;
² B
M: a set of bids which represents the shortlisted bids that will be recommended to the user;
² B
R: a set of bids which represents those selected by the user (and will be rewarded by the
auctioneer agent);
² SU: a set of recommendations displayed in the user's sidebar (i.e. B
M ignoring the prices);
² SU
R: a set of recommendations that are selected by the user (i.e. B
R ignoring the prices);
² N: number of user-selected recommendations;
² bl;bh: two bids for temporary use (l;h 2 [1::M]);
² Rh: reward to h
th user-selected recommendation.
The Algorithm:
B
ALL = Á;
B
M = Á;
B
R = Á; // system initialization
CallForBids(AB;M;Tb); // system calls for bids
repeat during the duration of auction Tb
f
bij = GenerateBid(Abi;urlj;pricej);
B
ALL = B
ALL [ fbijg;
g
for l = 1 to M do // shortlist M highest bids
f
bl = FindBidWithLthTopPrice(B
ALL;l);
B
M = B
M [ fblg;
g
SU = f hAbi;urlji j hAbi;urlj;priceji 2 B
Mg; // the set of shortlisted urls
SU
R = UserSelectsURLs(SU); // user makes selection (SU
R µ SU)
B
R = f hAbi;urlj;priceji j hAbi;urlji 2 SU
R and hAbi;urlj;priceji 2 B
Mg;
N = jB
Rj; // the number of user selected items
for h = 1 to N do
f // reward the user selected items
bh = FindHthBid(B
R;h);
Rh = ComputeReward(bh);
g
Figure 3.1: The Auction ProtocolChapter 3 Auction Mechanism Design for the Recommender System 36
each such user-selected recommendation, the suggesting agent is given a reward. A
given agent may have multiple recommendations selected in a given auction in which
case it receives multiple rewards. In de¯ning the ComputeReward function, our aim is
to ensure that it is both Pareto e±cient and social welfare maximizing (as per section
3.1). To this end, this section addresses the following issues: (i) How is one reward
mechanism judged to be better than another? (ii) Does there exist a reward mechanism
that is the best amongst all possible mechanisms? First, however, a complete set of
reward mechanisms is introduced.
3.3.1 The Complete Set of Reward Mechanisms
Let us assume we have N (de¯ned in section 3.2) user-selected recommendations to be
rewarded and the auctioneer has an amount of payo®, RT, to be distributed to the
relevant agents. The problem is then how to best split RT into parts and distribute
them to each of the rewarded recommender agents such that we cannot ¯nd any other
more optimal allocation solutions.
To this end, we de¯ne the complete set of reward mechanisms as follows: Suppose the
hth (h 2 [1::N]) user-selected recommendation receives an amount of payo® Rh. Then,
all possible reward mechanisms are such that the sum of each payo® is less than or
equal to RT. That is,
PN
h=1 Rh · RT. Therefore, we have a complete set of reward
mechanisms, ^ <, such that:
^ < = f (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;RN) j
PN
h=1 Rh · RTg
Now each element of ^ < is a possible allocation of RT and ^ < can be split into two
complementary subsets: ^ <1 that does not completely allocate all of RT (called a With
Surplus Mechanism (WSM)) and ^ <2 that does allocate all of RT (called a No Surplus
Mechanism (NSM)):
^ <1 = f (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;RN) j
PN
h=1 Rh < RTg (WSM)
^ <2 = f (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;RN) j
PN
h=1 Rh = RTg (NSM)
From these two subsets, we want to identify those that are both Pareto e±cient and
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NSM maximizes the total payo® and it is impossible to distinguish between any of these
points. A mechanism that produces a reward in the triangle, but not on the budget
payo® curve, is by de¯nition in the WSM set. For example, for point M1, R1 = r12,
R2 = r21 and R1 + R2 = r12 + r21 < RT.
In terms of Pareto e±ciency, for any point representing a WSM outcome, at least one
Pareto optimal point can be found representing a related NSM. For example, in Fig-
ure 3.2, point M1 (in WSM) can straightforwardly be transformed into M2 (in NSM)
by giving R2 the extra amount of reward (r22 ¡ r21). However, those points on the
budget curve cannot be improved upon since giving extra reward to either recommenda-
tion necessarily results in a loss to the other. Therefore, all NSM outcomes are Pareto
e±cient.
3.3.3 Social Welfare Maximizing Reward Mechanisms
Pareto e±ciency has nothing to say about the distribution of welfare across agents.
Thus, given two mechanisms that produce outcomes that are both Pareto e±cient, it is
not possible to say which is better. Thus, we need a further means of di®erentiation. To
this end, we seek to de¯ne a social welfare function that is able to assign a ranking to
all Pareto e±cient mechanisms. This ranking speci¯es the \social preference" [Varian,
2003] p590 of a distribution of overall welfare to di®erent rewarded recommendations
and should ensure that recommendations are rewarded according to how good they are.
However, in our system, there are two di®erent views on the quality of a recommendation:
internal quality and user perceived quality (see section 1.2). The inq is used to compute
the agents' bid price | the higher the quality, the higher its bid price. The upq
indicates how a recommendation satis¯es the user. Since the recommender system's
objective is to satisfy the user, the marketplace's objective is to shortlist the most valuable
recommendations in decreasing order of user perceived quality. Therefore, we decide to
reward the user-selected recommendations based on the upq and this quality can be
de¯ned as Qh 2 [1::100] (h 2 [1::N]). To do this, we can segment our set of potential
reward mechanisms that are Pareto e±cient (i.e. ^ <2) into two complementary subsets
| those that allocate reward in a manner proportional to the upq and those that do
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Proportional Reward Mechanism (PRM)
^ <P = f (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;RN) j Rh =
Qh PN
i=1 Qi
£ RT ; where h 2 [1::N]g
Non-Proportional Reward Mechanism (NPM) 2
^ <N = ^ <2 ¡ ^ <P
Given these two sets, we can now de¯ne our social welfare function in terms of utility.
As noted above, we want the system to prefer a reward mechanism that distributes
the welfare to the user-selected recommendations according to how well they satisfy the
user. Therefore, a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function [Varian, 2003] is introduced.
This function shows preferences of the inputs in a manner proportional to the value of
their powers:
U(R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;RN) = R1
Q1 ¢ R2
Q2 ¢ ¢¢¢ ¢ RN
QN (3.1)
In this function, the powers, Q1;Q2;¢¢¢ ;QN, describe how important each rewarded
agent's utility is to the overall social welfare. Speci¯cally, a reward mechanism, mi =
(R1;i, R2;i, ¢¢¢, RN;i) is better than (or more socially-preferred to) mj = (R1;j, R2;j,
¢¢¢, RN;j), if U(mi) > U(mj).
Our objective now is to ¯nd if there exists a best mechanism within ^ <2. Thus, we need
to determine if there is a mechanism that has the maximum utility value, given a total
amount of reward RT. That is:
Proposition:
There exists an m0 2 ^ <2, such that 8m 2 ^ <2, if m 6= m0, U(m0) > U(m).
Conditions:
N is a natural number (3.2)
Qi > 0 and is constant (i 2 [1::N]) (3.3)
RT > 0 and is constant (3.4)
R1 + R2 + ¢¢¢ + RN = RT (3.5)
Ri > 0 3 (i 2 [1::N]) (3.6)
2Note that ^ <P contains only one element (given an R
T and a set of Qi, whose values are ¯xed, there
is only one solution for ^ <P), while ^ <N contains multiple elements.
3We do not consider the case of Ri = 0; i 2 [1::N], since this case must result in U = 0 and any
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Proof:
In the case of N = 1, R1 = RT ensures the maximal value of U and this is the solution
that we want. We now turn to the case of N > 1. Based on the given conditions, the
utility function always results in a positive value within the whole input range. There-
fore, a monotonic transformation of the original utility function, V = lnU, simpli¯es
the problem.
V (R1;R2;¢¢¢ ;RN) =
N X
i=1
Qi lnRi (3.7)
Hence, ¯nding the maximum value of U is equivalent to ¯nding that of V . We will ¯rst
determine whether there exists extrema in function V , and then verify how many there
are, and then, whether they are maxima or minima.
Function (3.7) has one constraint (condition (3.5)) on the N input variables. Thus, only
N ¡ 1 variables remain independent. Let us consider that R1 is dependent of the other
N ¡ 1 variables
R1 = RT ¡ (R2 + R3 + ¢¢¢ + RN) (3.8)
Substituting equation (3.8) for R1 in function (3.7), we get:
V = Q1 ln[RT ¡ (R2 + ¢¢¢ + RN)] + Q2 lnR2 + ¢¢¢ + QN lnRN (3.9)
Therefore, in (3.9), R2 ¢¢¢RN are independent of each other. The necessary condition
for V reaching extrema is:
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
@V
@R2 =
¡Q1
RT¡(R2+R3+¢¢¢+RN) +
Q2
R2 = 0
@V
@R3 =
¡Q1
RT¡(R2+R3+¢¢¢+RN) +
Q3
R3 = 0
. . .
@V
@RN =
¡Q1
RT¡(R2+R3+¢¢¢+RN) +
QN
RN = 0
(3.10)
Now (3.10) has N ¡ 1 equations and N ¡ 1 variables and is non-simpli¯ed. Its unique
series of solutions is Rj = RT Qj PN
i=1 Qi
;(j 2 [2 ¢ ¢N]). Substituting this for R2 to RN in
equation (3.8), we get:
Rh = RT Qh
PN
i=1 Qi
, where h 2 [1 ¢ ¢N]: (3.11)
We record this extremum, (3.11), as MPRM and note that it represents the PRM by its
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on RT and is, therefore, easier to compute. In our revised mechanism, all user-selected
recommendations are ordered in decreasing rank of upq (such that Q1 > Q2 > ¢¢¢ > QN)
and each reward is based on the (M + 1)
th price PM+1 (the highest not shortlisted bid)
instead of RT:
Rh = ± ¢ Qh ¢ PM+1 (3.17)
where h 2 [1::N], ± is the reward coe±cient and ± > 0. This new mechanism also
ensures recommendations are rewarded proportionally to their upqs and is therefore
also ideal from the perspective of maximizing social welfare. This is because as each Rh
(h 2 [1::N]) is known, the value of the total payo®
PN
h=1 Rh is also known. Among all
possible allocations for this total payo®, mechanism (3.17) ensures the maximal social
welfare according to section 3.3.3. Given any value of ±, with respect to each speci¯c
auction round, PM+1 is ¯xed. So, RT is ¯xed and thus solution (3.17) is equivalent to
(3.11). We base the reward on PM+1 (whose value is not known by the bidding agents)
so that the market cannot be manipulable by the participants [Varian, 2003] p289. If
the reward is based on the prices from the rewarded recommendations, the rewarded
agents might be able to a®ect the market through their prices since they are aware of
the history of both rewards and bid prices. Our approach also reduces the possibility of
bidding collusions because the reward is based on something that the rewarded agents
are unaware of and cannot control.
However, the reward mechanism (3.17), as it currently stands, does not satisfy the sys-
tem objective of shortlisting the most valuable recommendations in decreasing order of
upq. This is because all individually rational agents will bid the same price (marginally
higher than PM+1) to maximize their revenue. This is because a bidder's revenue is the
reward obtained minus the bidding price that has been paid (section 3.2) and, hence,
a rational bidder should bid as low as possible to be shortlisted. When all shortlisted
recommendations have the same bidding price, the system cannot di®erentiate and rank
them by price. Therefore, we need a mechanism that can relate and regulate the bidding
price according to the upq (i.e. higher quality means a higher price).
To achieve this, we involve two other variables: Ph (h 2 [1::N]) and P¤
m (m 2 [1::M]).
Ph is the bidding price of the hth rewarded recommendation (user-selected recommen-
dation with the hth highest upq). P¤
m is the historical average bidding price of the mth
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not actually know this value). By this de¯nition, P¤
m indicates the price for the mth
advertisement displayed in the user's browser sidebar which is decided by the invisible
hand (namely the market) [Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2001].
With this additional information, we can now ¯ne-tune the reward mechanism towards
the system objective. We expect the ¯ne-tuned mechanism to incentivise the recom-
mender agents to bid their recommendations in a way that is proportional to the upqs
of the items (so as to shortlist the recommendations in decreasing order of the upq).
And, on the other hand, the shortlisted agents can only maximize their revenue by bid-
ding in this manner. To achieve this, instead of (3.17), we adjust the reward to the hth
rewarded recommendation to:
Rh = ± ¢ Qh ¢ PM+1 ¡ ® ¢ jP¤
h ¡ Phj (3.18)
where ® is another system coe±cient and ® > 1. The speci¯c values of ± and ® are
not yet de¯ned and their values will depend upon the speci¯cs of the application (see
Chapter 4 for details).
The reward mechanism in (3.18), compared with (3.17), gives recommender agents the
incentive to adjust their bids to di®erent levels according to their belief about the cor-
responding upq. With (3.18), the market can di®erentiate shortlisted recommendations
by price so that the marketplace can shortlist good recommendations in decreasing or-
der of upq. Moreover, under certain conditions, mechanism (3.18) will tend to be the
same as (3.17) (to be discussed in section 3.5). Hence, mechanism (3.18) satis¯es all the
requirements listed in section 3.1.
3.4 Designing the Agents' Bidding Strategies
Rational bidders seek to maximize their revenue and they do this by bidding sensibly
for recommendations that they believe are valuable to the user. If they provide poor
recommendations they will either be not-shortlisted (revenue unchanged) or shortlisted
but not rewarded (revenue decreases); if they provide recommendations that are rele-
vant to the user's interest but either bid too high or too low (with respect to P¤
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section 3.3.4) they will also lose revenue4. The outcome of such bids is that the corre-
sponding recommendation is: not shortlisted, shortlisted but not rewarded, or rewarded.
Depending on what happened to its previous bid for the given recommendation, a ratio-
nal bidder should base the bidding price of its next bid (Pnext) for that recommendation
on (i) the inq, (ii) the last bid price (Plast) and (iii) the previous rewards to this rec-
ommendation. Assuming the inq for next recommendation is unchanged, we need only
consider the bidding strategies with respect to price and reward. To this end, we make
one assumption and we will ensure this holds in developing and simulating the practical
bidding strategies discussed in sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.3:
Assumption: With respect to a given internal quality level, there are recommendations
in the next bid that have the same quality level.
With this in place, we now consider the three potential outcomes from bidding.
3.4.1 Bid Not Shortlisted
This leaves the agent's revenue unchanged since it neither has to pay for its advertising,
nor does it receive a reward. The only way to increase revenue is to get the recommen-
dation shortlisted (since this might bring a reward). Therefore, the agent will increase
its bidding price for the same recommendation:
Pnext = Y ¢ Plast (Y > 1)
This is the dominant strategy (something the agent is best o® by using no matter what
strategies the other agents use | section 2.4) in this case since being shortlisted and
rewarded is the only way of increasing revenue.
3.4.2 Bid Shortlisted But Not Rewarded
These agents lose revenue since they pay for the advertising but receive no reward. This
means the agent overrated its inq with respect to the upq and so the agent should
4This is because the second term of equation (3.18) will not be zero, which results in a decrease of
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decrease its price in subsequent rounds so as to lose less:
Pnext = Z ¢ Plast (0 < Z < 1)
This is the dominant strategy in this case since keeping the same price or even raising
it will result in further losses.
3.4.3 Bid Rewarded
These agents have a good correlation between their inq for a recommendation and that
of the upq. Therefore, these agents have a chance of increasing their revenue. The pro¯t
made by the hth rewarded recommendation is:
»h = ± ¢ Qh ¢ PM+1 ¡ ® ¢ jP¤
h ¡ Phj ¡ Ph
However, since the agent is unaware of P¤
h, it does not know whether »h has been maxi-
mized. Hence, it must minimize (®¢jP¤
h ¡Phj+Ph) so as to maximize »h. Furthermore,
the agent does not know whether Ph is higher or lower than P¤
h. In either case, however,
the agent will de¯nitely make a loss if Ph is not close to P¤
h (proof below).
Assume the set of recommending agents remains unchanged between successive auctions
and they produce recommendations of the same quality level (we discuss what happens
when this situation does not hold in section 3.5). The upq for the hth rewarded recom-
mendation will remain in the hth place in subsequent auctions. Given this, P¤
h is related
to Qh, such that the agent with the hth rewarded recommendation is able to estimate
the value of P¤
h. Now consider the design of the strategy for the hth rewarded recommen-
dation. We ¯nd that the hth rewarded agent can always be aware of whether its price
is closer to or farther from the hth historical average market price, P¤
h, by adjusting its
bidding prices. In this way, the agent can minimize its loss. The proof is given below.
Assumptions [static marketplace]:
(i) The hth rewarded recommendation remains the hth highest upq in subsequent bids.
(ii) P¤
h remains stable in subsequent bids. (iii) There are su±cient bidders in the market
with not-shortlisted increasing prices and shortlisted but not rewarded decreasing pricesChapter 3 Auction Mechanism Design for the Recommender System 47
to ensure PM+1 remains stable. (iv) ¢P > 0, which represents an increment or a
decrement of bidding prices.
Proposition:
When adjusting the bidding price of the hth rewarded recommendation, an agent makes
a pro¯t increment if the price approaches the historical average price of the hth adver-
tisement slot; otherwise, it makes a pro¯t decrement.
Proof:
According to assumptions (i) and (ii), P¤
h is unchanged with respect to the hth rewarded
recommendation. So the corresponding agent can estimate the value of P¤
h.
When Ph < P¤
h, its pro¯t in the current bid is:
»hl = ± ¢ Qh ¢ PM+1 ¡ ®jP¤
h ¡ Phj ¡ Ph
= ± ¢ Qh ¢ PM+1 ¡ ®P¤
h + (® ¡ 1)Ph
Given that PM+1 is stable (assumption (iii)), if the agent raises the price by ¢P in the
next bid, its pro¯t in the next bid will be:
»hli = ± ¢ Qh ¢ PM+1 ¡ ®jP¤
h ¡ (Ph + ¢P)j ¡ (Ph + ¢P)
= ± ¢ Qh ¢ PM+1 ¡ ®P¤
h + (® ¡ 1)Ph + (® ¡ 1)¢P
Since ® > 1 and ¢P > 0, »hli ¡ »hl = (® ¡ 1)¢P > 0.
When Ph < P¤
h, if the agent decreases the price by ¢P in the next bid, its pro¯t will
be:
»hld = ± ¢ Qh ¢ PM+1 ¡ ®jP¤
h ¡ (Ph ¡ ¢P)j ¡ (Ph ¡ ¢P)
= ± ¢ Qh ¢ PM+1 ¡ ®P¤
h + (® ¡ 1)Ph ¡ (® ¡ 1)¢P
Therefore, »hld ¡ »hl = ¡(® ¡ 1)¢P < 0.
The case when Ph > P¤
h can be proven in the same way.
Thus, when changing the bid price, an agent makes a pro¯t increment if the price
approaches the average price; otherwise, it makes a pro¯t loss. In case of the bid priceChapter 3 Auction Mechanism Design for the Recommender System 50
At equilibrium, since the bidding prices are aligned with the upq, the system can produce
a shortlist of recommendations in decreasing order of upq which is precisely the objective
of the recommender system.
3.6 Economical Evaluations of the Marketplace
This section evaluates the market mechanism design with respect to the ¯rst three
desiderata of section 3.1.
² Pareto E±ciency: With the reward mechanism de¯ned in (3.18), the historical
average market price, P¤
h, re°ects how the majority of bidders value a given adver-
tisement slot and this price becomes the expected equilibrium price. With such a
reward mechanism, each bidder iterates itself to the corresponding expected equi-
librium price. Therefore, the market has a tendency to converge to the equilibrium.
With the market tending to equilibrium, the second term in reward mechanism
(3.18) tends to zero. Therefore, this mechanism tends to be the same as mechanism
(3.17), which is the ideal Pareto e±cient mechanism.
² Social Welfare Maximization: With the market tending to equilibrium, reward
mechanism (3.18) tends to be the same as mechanism (3.17). Thus, this reward
mechanism tends to reward all user selected recommendations in a manner that is
proportional to their upq. Therefore, (3.18) maximizes social welfare and is the
most socially-preferred.
² Individual Rationality: According to the analysis in section 3.4, the market mech-
anism produces individually rational dominant strategies for the cases in which
the bids are not shortlisted, shortlisted but not rewarded and rewarded. Thus, all
the agents bid rationally by taking the dominant strategy accordingly.
3.7 Summary
Based on the above discussions, the generalized ¯rst-price sealed-bid auction protocol
was adopted and the PRM reward mechanism was found to be appropriate for ourChapter 3 Auction Mechanism Design for the Recommender System 51
context. Speci¯cally, this reward mechanism is capable of incentivising the recommender
agents to bid in a manner that aligns their recommendations with those that are likely to
satisfy the user. And, in turn, based on the reward received and the price paid, the agents
can build up their bidding strategies in terms of individual rationality and stability so
as to maximise their revenue. As the marketplace dynamically chases the equilibrium,
the frequently shortlisted recommendations adjust their prices to some suitable levels
to maximise the revenue and thus the higher the upq a recommendation gains the
higher the price is. Therefore, the frequently shortlisted recommendations tend to bid
in the decreasing order of the upq when the market tends to equilibrium. In this
way, the marketplace works as a black box in controlling a recommender system that
has a large number of raw input items and a small number of desirable output items.
Moreover, the marketplace has been shown to be capable of correlating the upqs with
the recommenders' inqs of the recommendations.
This chapter contributes to the thesis in the following manner: an auction protocol, re-
ward mechanism and a set of bidding strategies are developed to assist the market-based
recommendations in this chapter. The reward mechanism is proved to be Pareto optimal
and social welfare maximizing. It is able to give clear incentives of user preferences to
recommender agents, relate the recommenders' bids to the upqs of their recommenda-
tions and shortlist recommendations in decreasing order of their upqs. Compared to
other work in the literature of information ¯ltering and recommender systems (content-
based, collaborative, demographic and hybrid ¯ltering techniques), our approach is the
¯rst attempt to automate the coordination of multiple di®erent techniques.
With the auction mechanism design in place, a number of experiments are needed to
evaluate the operational characteristics of the marketplace so that its practicality as a
controller for a recommender system can be ascertained. This is the subject of Chapter 4.Chapter 4
Simulating and Evaluating the
Marketplace
This chapter reports on the simulation experiments to evaluate the market mechanisms
designed for our recommender system in Chapter 3 with respect to the last ¯ve criteria
described in section 3.1.
This chapter contributes to the thesis in the following manner. The simulations demon-
strate that (i) the theoretical design of the market mechanism in Chapter 3 is viable to
coordinate recommendations; (ii) the marketplace does indeed work as a black box that
gives clear incentives of users' interests to the recommender agents; (iii) the marketplace
is able to correlate the upqs of recommendations to the recommender agents' inqs; (iv)
the recommender agents are able to maximize their revenue by bidding with the feed-
back from the marketplace that re°ects a user's interests; and (v) the marketplace is
stable in that it can avoid aggressive bidders dominating the marketplace and it is fair
to all agents that bid their recommendations.
In more detail, the experimental settings are discussed in section 4.1. The evaluations
of the marketplace are then presented in section 4.2. Section 4.3 evaluates the market
properties and the correlation between the upq and the inq in more general cases when
multiple features of recommendations are considered. Section 4.4 evaluates the system's
ability to seek out the recommendation with the highest upq value from all bids and
recommend it to the user.
52Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 53
4.1 Experimental Settings
As per Figure 1.2, our system is composed of three kinds of agents: the auctioneer agent,
the recommender agents and the user agent, which will be dealt with in sections 4.1.1,
4.1.2 and 4.1.3 respectively. Before we discuss these agents, however, an important
system variable, the number of bids called for, M (de¯ned in section 3.2), needs to be
decided. Here we use the value of ten (because our previous study showed this is the
number of items that can be managed e±ciently in the browser's sidebar [Moreau et al.,
2002]).
4.1.1 Con¯guring the Auctioneer Agent
The auctioneer agent determines the reward paid to the agents who make recommen-
dations selected by the user. Given that the rewarded mechanism is de¯ned in for-
mula (3.18), two system variables control the auctioneer agent: ± and ® (de¯ned in
section 3.3.4). From the reward mechanism, we can see that ± a®ects the volume of
the credit paid to a particular user-selected recommendation. The bigger ± is, the more
the recommendation is paid. We can also see that ® a®ects the sensitivity of the in-
centives the marketplace delivers to the recommender agents to make them aware of
the equilibrium (because the recommender agents need large alterations to chase the
equilibrium price if ® is big). In our experiment, we set ± = 1:5 and ® = 1:5 (based on
our experience that these values enable the recommender agents to both increase their
revenue by making good recommendations over the long term and chase the equilibrium
quickly [Wei et al., 2003a]).
4.1.2 Con¯guring the Recommender Agents
In this subsection, we discuss how a recommender agent generates a bid and how it
relates the bidding price to its inq for a recommendation. Before delving into this
discussion, however, the number of recommender agents contained in our system needs
to be de¯ned. We assign this system variable (see S de¯ned in Figure 3.1) a value of
nine (to ensure there is a su±cient number of input recommendations and su±cient
competition in the marketplace). This value is chosen for experimental expediency and,Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 54
in practice, it would depend on how many actual recommender agents participate in the
marketplace.
Each agent has a set of recommendations available to suggest (typically ordered accord-
ing to their inqs). Each such agent needs to compute the relation between its local
perception of relevance and the user's preference. Having done this, it can then bid an
appropriate price to maximize its revenue. Thus, the agent will relate its bidding price
to its knowledge about the upq (re°ected by the rewards it has received) with respect
to di®erent inq levels. We term this relationship between the bidding price and the inq
an agent's strategy pro¯le. This pro¯le is on a per agent basis. It records an agent's
bidding price for di®erent inq levels and indicates how an agent should relate its bid to
its inq.
Simulating Recommendation Methods. To assess the broad feasibility of our
market-based approach, we want our representation of the inqs to be capable of corre-
sponding to as many recommendation techniques as possible. Moreover, we do not want
our results to be skewed by any innate bias in the recommendation methods themselves.
Therefore, we take an abstract view on the recommender methods and view them simply
as being able to learn a user's interests based on their internal belief about certain rec-
ommendation properties (features or attributes) that the user's context focuses on. We
believe this is a reasonable abstraction because a recommendation method's ability to
adaptively match certain recommendation properties to the user's actual preferences has
been shown to be crucial to making high quality recommendations [Claypool et al., 1999]
(see Chapter 6 for three real recommendation methods developed for user evaluations).
Given these observations, we de¯ne the inq of a speci¯c recommendation method to be
the sum of the weighted evaluation scores made of di®erent techniques on di®erent prop-
erties of a recommendation (see equation (4.1)). This is consistent with the observation
that e®ective recommendation methods need to combine ¯ltering techniques based on
di®erent recommendation properties to achieve peak performance [Burke, 2002]. To thisChapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 55
end, we simulate the recommendation methods' inqs on a linear basis1. More formally,
q(Rec) = k1 ¢ ©1(Rec) + k2 ¢ ©2(Rec) + ¢¢¢ + kI ¢ ©I(Rec) (I > 0) (4.1)
where q(Rec) represents the inq of item Rec based on a speci¯c method. This method
evaluates an item from I perspectives (i.e. properties, features or attributes). The value
of I is on a per method basis because di®erent methods evaluate di®erent numbers
of properties of an item. Here, each ©i(Rec) (i 2 [1::I]) represents the evaluation
function based on a speci¯c property of Rec (©i(Rec) 2 [0;1:0])2. Such properties
can be either objective (such as the TFIDF [Salton, 1989] of a document), subjective
(such as customers' opinions of the tastes of the foods in a restaurant) or a mixture
of the two (such as users' opinions of the textual and graphical descriptions of the
products of a store). Note that di®erent evaluation functions might evaluate the same
property of a recommendation but from di®erent perspectives. For example, ©i and ©j
are two functions that evaluate the same property (x) of a recommendation. However,
©i = sin(x) whereas ©j = cos(x). Variable ki (ki > 0) speci¯es the weight of ©i(Rec)
and k1 + k2 + ¢¢¢ + kI = 1:0 in order to ensure 0 6 q 6 1:0.
For example, consider the case where the user's browsing context is local restaurants. In
this situation, an individual recommendation method might base its inq on the TFIDF
of an online restaurant menu with a value between 0 to 1.0, other people's opinions of the
food on the restaurant's website with an integer voting value of 1 .. 5 (normalization will
be used), whether the user has ever consumed the service of the current restaurant with
a binary value of 0 or 1, or any other possible properties of the item. In our case, each
of these corresponds to a speci¯c ©i(Rec) and if a particular method uses a combination
of these base terms then appropriate values for the respective ki's would be set.
The next step is to determine how to simulate ©. Based on our previous studies in this
area, by randomly collecting 400 di®erent Web pages on the subject of \world news", we
1This linear combination is used by several hybrid recommender systems in combining results from
di®erent recommendation methods (see section 2.1.4). Through combining di®erent weighted properties
or features, it is believed that a recommendation method can improve its precision in predicting the
user's preference and improve its quality of recommendations [Pazzani, 1999, Yu et al., 2003].
2When evaluating di®erent recommendation methods, we perform a normalization on the results to
¯x them into a range of [0;1:0]. This is because di®erent recommendation methods have di®erent quality
(or rating) ranges [Pennock et al., 2000]. This can be achieved in practice by adaptively matching a
method's min and max inq value onto 0 and 1.0 respectively. This makes the values from di®erent
methods meaningful in our market based recommender system in terms of inq and upq.Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 56
¯nd that the keyword similarity [Moreau et al., 2002] of the 400 documents compared
to CNN's frontpage (http://www.cnn.com) follows a Gaussian normal distribution (see
the contour of the distribution in Figure 4.1(a)). Hence, we decide to use some Gaussian
normal distributions to model the valuations of properties (©) of recommendations in
predicting user's preferences on a probabilistic basis [Popescul et al., 2001, Sharma and
Poole, 2001]. Speci¯cally, in our experiments, we simulate di®erent document properties
of one method by di®erent random variables that follow di®erent normal distributions.
The probability density function of the normal distribution is de¯ned as3:
N(¹;¾2) : f(q) =
1
p
2¼ ¾
e
¡
(q¡¹)2
2¾2 , q 2 [0;1:0] (4.2)
where ¹ and ¾ are the mean value and the standard deviation of the random samples
(see Figure 4.1(b)). The mean of the distribution represents the average value of the
inqs of all samples generated by the corresponding method. The middle range (between
one unit of standard deviation on both sides of the mean) of the distribution contains
the majority of the samples (about 68 percent of its total).
One of the key objectives of the recommender agents is to build up their strategy pro¯les
so that they can relate their bidding price to their inqs based on their knowledge about
the reward (which, in turn, re°ects the upq of the recommendations). In order to
learn such characteristics for all inq levels, each agent divides its strategy pro¯le into
20 continuous segments. In each auction, a recommender agent needs to compute the
inqs of ten recommendations and make ten corresponding bids. In the early auction
rounds, all the agents' strategy pro¯les are empty. With an empty strategy pro¯le, an
agent will bid proportionally (because it can only expect a high inq recommendation
to receive a high upq and, consequently, more reward than a low inq recommendation)
to the inq of ten (value of M de¯ned in section 3.2) recommendations based on an
initial seeding price. We set di®erent initial seeding price values (randomly generated
from the range [128, 256]4) for di®erent recommender agents (because di®erent agents
value their recommendations di®erently with their empty strategy pro¯les). After each
auction, all strategy pro¯le segments record and update information about: the last bid
3We ¯x the sample into the range [0, 1.0] (rather than (-1, +1)) since we have manipulated the
inq into this range (see equation (4.1)).
4The exact values of the boundary of the range are not important. What matters is whether such
a randomly given range can make the market converge and exhibit the other properties speci¯ed in
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Table 4.1: User's Decision of Di®erent Models
Shortlisted Recommendations Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10
User Perceived Quality 70 50 75 30 60 82 90 85 65 55
Decision of Independent Selection 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Decision of Search-Till-Satis¯ed 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Both models have the same AT of 60. Search-till-satis¯ed model has a ST of 80. \1" means the
recommendation is selected to be rewarded, while \0" means not selected.
to his valuation of the recommendation. This number Qi is the upq value. To simulate
the choices of a user in selecting recommendations, we deploy a user model inside the
user agent. Building on the user simulation of Bohte et al. (see section 2.5), we adopt
the following models:
² Independent Selection: The selection of one recommendation is independent of the
others. Once the upq of a recommendation is greater than or equal to a particular
acceptance threshold (AT), the recommendation is accepted and rewarded. Those rec-
ommendations with upq less than AT will not be selected and therefore receive no
reward.
² Search-Till-Satis¯ed Behaviour: The selection of one recommendation is dependent on
other recommendations that are ranked above it in the list. In this case, the user stops
searching once he discovers a recommendation that has a upq greater than or equal to
a particular satisfaction threshold (ST).
By means of an illustration, Table 4.1 is an example of a user's decision under the two
di®erent models. All recommendations with upq above the AT (60) are selected to be
rewarded in the case of independent selection. However, Q7, Q8 and Q9 are not selected
to be rewarded by the search-till-satis¯ed behaviour though their upqs are above the
AT. Indeed, the user stops searching since a document with a quality of 82 (Q6) has
been found above the ST (80).
We simulate the user by a user agent which knows its valuation for each recommendation
and assigns the upq based on this valuation correspondingly. Thus, when a real user
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is de¯ned as:
Q(Rec) = k0
1 ¢ ©0
1(Rec) + k0
2 ¢ ©0
2(Rec) + ¢¢¢ + k0
I0 ¢ ©0
I0(Rec) (4.3)
where ©0
i(Rec) (whose de¯nition is equivalent to that of ©i(Rec) in equation (4.1),
©0
i(Rec) 2 [0;1:0], i 2 [1::I0]) is the evaluation function based on a speci¯c property of
Rec. k0
i (k0
i > 0, i 2 [1::I0]) is the weight of ©0
i(Rec) contributing to Q(Rec). We set
k0
1 + k0
2 + ¢¢¢ + k0
I0 = 100 to ensure 0 6 Q 6 100.
4.1.4 Correlating the UPQ to the INQ
From the formal speci¯cations of the upq and the inq of a given item, as given in
equations (4.1) and (4.3), it can be seen whether the evaluation functions of the document
that the user considers overlap with those that a recommendation method considers.
Here, we de¯ne the set of evaluation functions f©0
1;©0
2;¢¢¢ ;©0
I0g that the user evaluates
as 'Q. Likewise, we de¯ne the set of functions f©1;©2;¢¢¢ ;©Ig that a recommendation
method evaluates as 'q. We de¯ne ' = 'Q \ 'q as the recommendation method's
e®ective factors in terms of the upq. We de¯ne ' = 'Q ¡ 'q as the recommendation
method's ine®ective factors. The variable ' is important, because if ' 6= Á (Á stands for
\empty set") the method will have some correlation with the upq since their evaluations
of the recommendation items share some of the same evaluation functions. Otherwise,
if ' = Á, a recommendation method cannot correlate its inq to the upq since they
evaluate the items from totally di®erent perspectives. These issues will be discussed in
detail in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
By abstracting all recommendation methods as independent learners that predict user's
preferences, all predictions can be seen as composed of e®ective data and noisy data on a
probabilistic basis [Popescul et al., 2001, Sharma and Poole, 2001]. This, in turn, simpli-
¯es modeling the market-based constituent recommenders on a high abstraction level.
Speci¯cally, by de¯ning a recommendation method's e®ective and ine®ective factors,
given a recommendation item Rec, its upq can be represented in terms of a method's
inq as follows:
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where ¡ and ¡ are two mapping functions that align the coe±cients of the elements of '
and ' with the weightings (k0
i) of the evaluation functions (©0
i) of Q (see equation (4.3)).
For example, assume a user evaluates an item Rec from perspectives of ©a, ©b and
©c and the importance of these functions are k0
a, k0
b and k0
c respectively (k0
a + k0
b +
k0
c = 100 and k0
a;k0
b;k0
c > 0), the upq will be Q = k0
a©a + k0
b©b + k0
c©c. Assuming a
recommendation method evaluates the item from perspectives of ©a, ©b and ©d and their
relative importance is ka, kb and kd respectively (ka;kb;kd > 0 and ka + kb + kd = 1:0),
its inq is q = ka©a + kb©b + kd©d. Thus, the inq's e®ective factors are ' = f©a; ©bg
and its ine®ective factor is ' = f©cg. Therefore, ¡(©a;©b) = (
k0
a
ka
k0
b
kb) £
0
@ka©a
kb©b
1
A and
¡(©c) = (k0
c) £ (©c). We ¯nd that when a recommendation method's e®ective factors
form a major weighting of both its inq and the upq (e.g., in the above example, ©a and
©b contribute
ka+kb
ka+kb+kd of the weighting of the inq and
k0
a+k0
b
k0
a+k0
b+k0
c weighting of the upq),
this method can easily correlate its inq to the upq (see section 4.3 for more details),
and can continuously produce good recommendations and make pro¯ts. Otherwise, if a
method has only ine®ective factors, the method cannot correlate its inq to the upq and
therefore makes poor recommendations most of the time and will go bankrupt. These
properties will be discussed in more detail in section 4.3.
4.2 Evaluation of the Marketplace
Having outlined the setup of the three kinds of agents speci¯ed in section 4.1, this section
will focus on evaluating the system properties. In our case, the market is the key to
coordinating the various recommendation methods. If it does not work e®ectively, the
system will not be able to make good recommendations. Among the ¯ve properties we
want our market to exhibit, convergence is the most important because it forms the basis
of the other four. Therefore, we will start with experiments on market convergence.Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 61
4.2.1 Market Convergence
We endow our system with 100 documents ready to be recommended to the user5.
Every time the user visits a speci¯c recommendation, the upq of this recommendation
is assigned by the user and this value is independent of the various methods' inqs. To
simplify the experiments on evaluating the properties (©i) of a recommendation item,
we assume each recommendation method evaluates items from only one perspective (but
two di®erent methods may use di®erent perspectives). The more general case with more
than one ©i involved in each method is dealt with in section 4.3. We further assume the
user considers two di®erent properties of the recommendations (©0 and ©1). Thus, the
e®ective and ine®ective factors of the recommendation methods can be easily controlled6.
Assuming the weighting of the two properties are k0 and k1, respectively, the upq can
be represented formally as:
Q(Rec) = k0 ¢ ©0(Rec) + k1 ¢ ©1(Rec) (4.5)
To generalize the experiments, nine constituent recommender agents are placed in our
marketplace and each of them is based on one of three di®erent properties (©1;©2;©3)
of recommendations (note here ©1 is the same as in equation (4.5)), meaning that some
of the recommendation methods contain the e®ective factors in terms of the upq and
some of them do not. We will use three Gaussian normal distribution functions (see
equation (4.2)) to simulate the valuations of the three properties. Each property re-
lates to one of the three distributions: N(0:35;0:12), N(0:5;0:12) and N(0:65;0:12) (see
Figure 4.2). We set the standard deviation to a value of 0.1, meaning the three di®er-
ent properties share only a small intersection (so as to easily di®erentiate the di®erent
methods). Thus, those methods' inqs based on ©1 can be presented formally as:
qi(Rec) = ©1(Rec) (i 2 [1::3]) (4.6)
5The working scenario and the con¯gurations of the upq and the inq in this section will be used for
all experiments in section 4.2.
6We can exemplify this case in a scenario where the user is browsing the local restaurants on the Web.
We assume the user evaluates the recommended restaurant websites from two perspectives: whether the
restaurant sells some speci¯c foods (©0) and other customers' opinions of the foods in the restaurant (©1).
If a recommendation method also computes ©1, then ©1 is its e®ective factor and ©0 is its ine®ective
factor in terms of the upq (mutatis mutandis if the method computes ©0). If a recommendation method
evaluates the recommendations by ©x (which is di®erent from ©1 and ©0), then it has no e®ective
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In the ¯rst experiment, each of the three properties is shared by three agents; thus
only the ¯rst three agents contain the e®ective factor, whereas the other six do not8.
From Figure 4.3(a), we can see that the shortlisted prices converge (for example, the
4th and 10th bid oscillate around 150 and 130 respectively, which indicate P¤
4 and P¤
10
respectively) after about 100 auctions. We ¯nd that, with the search-till-satis¯ed user
model (with ST = 60 and AT = 45), the market also converges (for which we do not
provide a ¯gure), but only after a longer time (more auction rounds) compared to the
independent selection. This takes longer because fewer agents are rewarded in this case
and they need more bids to chase the equilibrium price.
In the second experiment, all nine agents evaluate recommendations by property ©1. In
this case, the market converges very quickly (after about 30 auctions, see Figure 4.3(b)),
because all agents' inqs are actually the e®ective factors in terms of the upq. Thus they
have a good correlation with the user's valuation of the recommendations. Therefore,
more recommendations at each quality level can be related to the upq and the agents
receive more signals of the user's interests. This, in turn, means agents get su±cient
chances to alter their price e®ectively to chase the equilibrium price with respect to each
upq level. This results in a market that converges quickly.
In the third experiment, only the ¯rst agent evaluates ©1 and the other eight agents
evaluate ©2 or ©3. The market still converges but very slowly (after about 600 auctions,
see Figure 4.3(c)) with the ¯rst bid price oscillating around 125. This slow speed can
be accounted for by the fact that only one agent can relate its good recommendations'
bidding price to its inq with respect to each upq level and there are insu±cient good
recommendations. Therefore, the agent needs a longer time to get a su±cient number
of high quality recommendations to be rewarded and to chase the equilibrium price. In
this experiment with very few agents taking the e®ective factor in terms of upq, it is
interesting to see that the 10th bid price decreases till it reaches zero (see Figure 4.3(c))9.
8In this case, the ¯rst three agents can relate their bidding price to their inqs, since their inqs have a
relationship with the upq (contributing 75% of its total weighting, see equation (4.7)). Also the rewards
they received re°ect the upq with respect to a speci¯c recommendation. The remaining six agents
cannot relate their bids to their inqs because their inqs have no relationship with the upq and their
rewards. This subject will be discussed further in section 4.2.3.
9Actually only the ¯rst and second bid prices converge in this experiment. The second bid is not
plotted in Figure 4.3(c) because it is close to the ¯rst bid and we want to clearly display the convergence.
The other eight bids, the 3
rd » 10
th, do not converge to a positive level and decrease continuously till
reaching zero (for the same reason only the 10
th bid is plotted).Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 64
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Figure 4.3: Convergence of Shortlist Prices
The explanation is that most of the recommendations, from the eight agents with only
ine®ective factors as their inqs, cannot relate their bidding price to their inqs. Thus,
these agents cannot reason about the relationship between the rewards and the inqs
of the rewarded recommendations (since the rewards are based on the upq, not on the
inq). Therefore, the equilibrium price for such bids (if it exists) has no relationship with
the inq. Such a recommender agent cannot chase the equilibrium price based on the
inq. Such shortlisted (both rewarded and not-rewarded) recommendations will make
loss most of the time. Hence, most of the recommendations will bid as low as possible
to reduce their loss (this phenomenon continues till the bid price reaches zero meaning
paying nothing). The exception to this is the small number of bids from the only agent
with the e®ective factors. Overall, this experiment demonstrates that the marketplaceChapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 65
(a)
50
55
60
65
70
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U
s
e
r
 
P
e
r
c
e
i
v
e
d
 
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
Shortlisted Advertisement Slots
User Perceived Quality in One Auction
User Perceived Quality
(b)
50
55
60
65
70
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
U
s
e
r
 
P
e
r
c
e
i
v
e
d
 
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
Shortlisted Advertisement Slots
Average User Perceived Quality of Fifteen Continuous Auctions
User Perceived Quality
Figure 4.4: The upq of Shortlisted Recommendations (Experiment 1)
deters bad recommendations and only good recommendations can pass through.
When all the experiments are taken together, we ¯nd that the shortlisted prices always
converge after a number of iterations as long as there is at least one agent that has
e®ective factors. The speed of the convergence depends on the setting of the parameters
®, AT, ST, Y and Z. Since these variables are not our main concern here, we only
overview their e®ects. Broadly speaking, AT and ST a®ect the number of recommen-
dations being rewarded (because more agents are rewarded if their values are small).
By being rewarded more times, an agent receives more information and therefore can
chase the equilibrium faster. The variables Y and Z also a®ect the speed with which
the agent can chase the equilibrium. Speci¯cally, with high values of these variables, an
agent alters its price quickly to reach the equilibrium price.
4.2.2 E±cient Shortlists
The most important feature of our system is its capability to shortlist the best rec-
ommendations in decreasing order of upq when the market converges. To this end,
Figure 4.4(a) shows the upq of the shortlisted recommendations during the 100th auc-
tion (which is after convergence) in the ¯rst experiment introduced in section 4.2.1.
Here, we can see that the quality of the ten shortlisted recommendations has an overall
tendency to decrease in most cases (although there are some exceptions). Figure 4.4(b)
shows the average upq of ¯fteen continuous auctions after convergence (from the 101st
to the 115th auction). By averaging over these auctions, we can see that the upq de-
creases monotonically. Thus, Figure 4.4 tells us that our market mechanism is indeed
capable of shortlisting the best recommendations in decreasing order of upq. ThroughChapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 66
various experiments stated in section 4.2.1, we ¯nd that our market can always do so
and our results hold more broadly than just for this speci¯c experiment.
4.2.3 Clear Incentives
The next step is to see if the recommender agents can relate their bids to the inqs of
their recommendations (meaning an agent can generate a steady strategy pro¯le). In this
case, each recommender agent builds up its strategy pro¯le from its knowledge about the
bids with respect to its 20 inq segments. Speci¯cally, Figure 4.5(a) shows the bidding
prices for di®erent segments of the ¯rst recommender agent with the e®ective factors ©1
as its inq. From Figure 4.5(a), we can see that this agent's bidding prices for di®erent
inq segments oscillate around certain levels after the market reaches the equilibrium
(after about 100 auctions). Figure 4.5(b) shows the agent's strategy pro¯le (equilibrium
bidding price versus the inq segments) and that higher inq does indeed relate to higher
bidding price. Indeed, this agent evaluates its inq on the e®ective factors, in particular,
on those that have a high weighting in the upq (see equations (4.5) and (4.7)). Thus,
the agent can relate its bidding price to its inq in such a way that the higher the
inq, the higher the corresponding upq, and the higher the bidding price. In this way,
the agent maximizes its revenue. Figure 4.5(c) shows the bidding prices for di®erent
segments of the seventh agent with the ine®ective factor ©3 as its inq and Figure 4.5(d)
depicts this agent's strategy pro¯le (which shows there is no relationship between the
bidding price and the inq). From ¯gures 4.5(c) and (d), we can see that this agent's
bidding prices do not reach equilibrium (because the agent has only ine®ective factors
as its inq). Therefore, it cannot relate its bids to its inq, because it cannot reason
about the relationship between the occasional rewards and the inqs of the rewarded
recommendations. Since high inq does not indicate high upq in this case, the upq
with respect to a speci¯c inq segment can vary dramatically. Therefore, based on the
upq, the rewards with respect to a speci¯c inq level do not converge (meaning that the
agent can learn nothing from the marketplace). Hence, based on the rewards (see the
relationship between the reward and the bidding price in equation (3.18)), the bidding
prices with respect to this inq level do not converge. Thus, the agent cannot build up a
practical strategy pro¯le after the market converges. Agents with ine®ective factor ©2Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 67
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Figure 4.5: Bidding Pro¯le and Strategy Pro¯le of Bidders with E®ective and Inef-
fective Factors
(Experiment 1)
exhibit the same properties as those agents with ©3 and we do not comment further on
them.
In addition to the bidding strategy pro¯le, we also examined the revenue and the number
of times these agents won in the auctions. From Figure 4.6(a), we can see that the ¯rst
three agents, with the e®ective factors, win more times than the remaining six agents
(that have ine®ective factors). Figure 4.6(b) shows that the ¯rst three agents can make
pro¯ts whereas the other six make a loss over time. Indeed, the agents with ine®ective
factors always bid high enough to be shortlisted (see section 4.2.4 for more information
about equal opportunities of being shortlisted), but they are not able to learn anything
from the few occasional rewards that they receive. Thus, these agents pay more when
shortlisted than they earn when rewarded10.
When taken together, ¯gures 4.5 and 4.6 indicate that the agents with e®ective factors in
terms of upq are capable of \learning" from the marketplace to alter their bids to certain
10The rational bidding strategy for those agents who cannot learn anything from the market is to bid
as low as possible to lose less money, see Figure 4.3(c) and its explanation.Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 68
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Figure 4.6: Number of Winning and Bidders' Balance of Bidders with E®ective and
Ine®ective Factors
(Experiment 1)
levels in order to chase the equilibrium price. This, in turn, results in a maximization of
their revenue (see Chapter 5 for more details about learning). In contrast, agents with
ine®ective factors are not capable of learning from the market. From our observation
of the various simulations, with good correlations to the upq, a recommender agent's
strategy pro¯le changes quickly before the market converges and then becomes relatively
stable after convergence.
4.2.4 Fairness
We expect the market to be fair to all recommender agents irrespective of the recom-
mendation method they use. To see this, we use the ¯rst experiment con¯guration
introduced in section 4.2.1. From Figure 4.7, it can be seen that the curves that rep-
resent the number of recommendations being shortlisted (including both rewarded and
not rewarded) for each agent are closer to each other compared to the number of recom-
mendations being rewarded as shown in Figure 4.6(a). This means that all agents have
equal opportunities of suggesting their recommendations. Thus, the market is fair to all
agents whatever methods they use.
However, di®erent methods do not necessarily have an equal opportunity of being re-
warded as shown in Figure 4.6(a). This, in turn, highlights the fact that a fair market
does not mean that all agents are equally likely to receive reward. Rather, the opportu-
nity of being rewarded depends on the upq of the recommendations.Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 69
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Figure 4.7: Opportunity of Being Shortlisted (Experiment 1)
4.2.5 Stability
To evaluate the stability of the market with respect to bidding strategies, we now consider
what happens if some of the agents no longer follow the dominant strategies of section 3.4.
Here we assume the agents adopt a greedy strategy meaning they bid as much as possible
on every round to outbid others. To this end, we use the setting of the second experiment
introduced in section 4.2.1 with all nine agents taking the e®ective factors as their inqs.
However, we select one recommender agent (say the ¯rst one) as the greedy bidder and
the other agents still take the dominant strategy. Here, all recommender agents are
endowed with an initial credit of 65535. The greedy bidder always bids much higher
than the others to get its recommendations shortlisted with the hope of making pro¯t.
However, this greedy bidder does not receive any more rewards from its recommendations
when compared with the rewarded recommendations provided by the other non-greedy
bidders. Indeed, the reward is not based on the bid price, but rather on the upq
(for exactly this reason). With the same amount of reward with respect to the same
level of upq, however, the greedy bidder pays much more for each of its shortlisted
recommendations. Therefore, the greedy bidder goes bankrupt over time (see \Bidder
1" in Figure 4.8(a)), while the other non-greedy bidders keep increasing their balance
steadily. In comparison, when no greedy bidders participate, all recommender agents
keep increasing their balance as shown in Figure 4.8(b).Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 70
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Figure 4.8: Balance of Bidders with E®ective and Ine®ective Factors
4.3 Dealing with Multiple Recommendation Properties
Having evaluated the system properties with respect to the metrics stated in section 3.1,
this section considers the case where more than one recommendation property (© in-
troduced in section 4.1.2) is evaluated by both the user and the recommender agents.
This is important because many real recommendation methods evaluate more than one
property (or feature) of recommendations [Burke, 2002, Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994]
and it is important that our market-based recommender system performs well in such
cases.
However, ¯rst, we need to establish the con¯gurations of the three kinds of agents in our
marketplace. Since the auctioneer agent simply acts as the organizer of the marketplace,
rewarding the user-selected recommendations based on the upq, this agent remains the
same as in section 4.1.1. We still use the independent selection user model with AT = 66.
Since it is not practical to gather up every possible case that contains an arbitrary
number of properties (©) in one formula (for either upq or inq) and to exemplify the
correlations between these two qualities in a simple set of experiments, we begin the
analysis with two properties involved for each quality function (both the user and the
recommender agents). The more general cases in which each quality function evaluates
more than two properties can be analyzed in the same way. To this end, the con¯guration
of the user agent also remains unchanged, Q(Rec) = 75©1(Rec) + 25©0(Rec). The
recommender agents are each con¯gured to evaluate two properties: some agents share
both properties, some share only one property, and some share no property with the
user's valuation of the recommendations. In this section, we consider eight recommenderChapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 71
agents and their inqs are con¯gured as follows:
q1(Rec) = q5(Rec) = 0:75©1(Rec) + 0:25©0(Rec)
q2(Rec) = q6(Rec) = 0:75©1(Rec) + 0:25©3(Rec)
q3(Rec) = q7(Rec) = 0:75©3(Rec) + 0:25©0(Rec)
q4(Rec) = q8(Rec) = 0:75©2(Rec) + 0:25©3(Rec)
(4.8)
©0, ©1, ©2 and ©3 are con¯gured as per section 4.2.1. With these settings, we can see
that q1 and q5 fully contain the e®ective factors and they match the user's valuation
of recommendations accurately. Likewise, q2, q6, q3 and q7 partially match the user's
valuation, whereas q4 and q8 have no match. More formally, using a transformation of
the upq, Q(Rec) = (75©1(Rec) + 25©0(Rec))=100, to subtract each item in equation
array (4.8), we can expect the four methods to exhibit the following correlations to the
upq (where\" stands for \has no relationship to"):
q1(Rec) = q5(Rec) = 0:01 ¢ Q(Rec)
q2(Rec) = q6(Rec) = 0:01 ¢ Q(Rec) + 0:25 ¢ (©3(Rec) ¡ ©0(Rec))
q3(Rec) = q7(Rec) = 0:01 ¢ Q(Rec) + 0:75 ¢ (©3(Rec) ¡ ©1(Rec))
q4(Rec) = q8(Rec)  Q(Rec)
(4.80)
Having con¯gured the three kinds of agents, we are going to evaluate the market prop-
erties and validate that the correlations in equation array (4.80) do e®ect the agents'
bidding and learning behaviour. Again, the evaluation begins with the most important
system property | market convergence. Figure 4.9 again demonstrates that the market
converges (after about 80 auctions) with at least one agent capable of relating its inq
to the upq (the ¯rst and the ¯fth agents in this experiment).
Using similar simulations to the ones of section 4.2, we ¯nd that the market exhibits the
same properties: namely e±cient shortlists, clear incentives for agents to bid, stability
and fairness. Thus, we do not further discuss these issues in this section. Instead, we
will focus on how the di®erent recommendation methods correlate their inqs to the upq.
This problem can be decomposed into two subproblems:
(i) Can the agents relate their bids to their internal quality?
(ii) To what extent does each individual agent relate its inq to the upq?Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 72
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Figure 4.9: Convergence of Shortlisted Prices
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Figure 4.10: Strategy Pro¯les of Bidders with E®ective and Ine®ective Factors
To this end, the strategy pro¯les for four agents (q1, q2, q3 and q4) at the point when
the market reaches equilibrium are plotted in Figure 4.10. From Figure 4.10(a), we can
see that the ¯rst agent bids its recommendations from inq segments that are above the
level of 0.65 at a level that is much higher than 160, which is actually the equilibrium
price of the tenth bid (see Figure 4.9 after 80 auctions). Since the equilibrium price of
the tenth bid represents the lowest price to be shortlisted, we refer to it as the market
access price. For the ¯rst agent, both evaluation properties (©1 and ©0) are the e®ectiveChapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 73
factors and their weightings both match those in the upq. Thus, its inq fully matches
the upq. Being capable of relating its inq to the upq, this agent can establish from
which speci¯c inq segments its recommendations can be rewarded. From Figure 4.10(a),
we can also see that bids from inq segments that are below the level of 0.65 are lower
than the market access price. Indeed, the ¯rst agent learns from the marketplace that
these recommendations will not be rewarded and so it decreases their price so as not
to shortlist these items and avoid paying for them when they are unlikely to produce a
return.
From Figure 4.10(b), we can see that the second agent bids its recommendations from
very high inq segments (higher than the level of 0.80) at a level that is higher than the
market access price. The second agent has one of its two evaluating properties (©1) as
the e®ective factor and this contributes signi¯cantly to both the inq and the upq (both
with a weighting of 0.75). In this case, only a very high value of ©1 can give a high
value of q2 since ©1's weighting is much bigger than ©3's. Thus, very high inqs indicate
high values of upq, and, therefore, such recommendations have good correlations to the
user's preferences. Therefore, the agent only bids on very high inq recommendations
that are highly likely to be shortlisted. It does this to make pro¯t without incurring a
high risk of losing credits (i.e. shortlisted but not rewarded).
From Figure 4.10(c), we can see that the third agent has few segments with bids higher
than the market access price (compared to the ¯rst and second agents). The explanation
is that, even though one of its two evaluating properties (©0) is the e®ective factor, it
contributes too little to its inq (coe±cient value 0.25). Therefore, its inq cannot easily
be related to the upq. With fewer concrete signals from the rewards received, it is
di±cult for the agent to relate its bids to its inqs. Thus the agent is not con¯dent
enough to bid for certain items at a very high price (since it has a high risk of losing
credits without earning).
Figure 4.10(d) demonstrates that the fourth agent, having no e®ective factors, does not
dare to bid high enough for any items from any segments to be shortlisted. It behaves in
this way because it does not want to incur the risk of being shortlisted without receiving
any reward. This uncertainty comes from the fact that the agent cannot e®ectively relate
its inq to the upq. Thus it does not know what items from which segments match the
user's preference.Chapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 74
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Figure 4.11: Balance of Bidders with E®ective and Ine®ective Factors
When taken together, these experiments show that the agents' con¯dence to relate their
bids to the inq decreases from the ¯rst agent to the fourth. Theoretically, this point
can be shown in their inq functions with respect to the upq (see equation (4.80)). Thus,
the noise between the four agents' inqs and the upqs is, respectively, 0, 0:25(©4(Rec)¡
©0(Rec)), 0:75(©5(Rec)¡©1(Rec)) and full noise. Therefore, the agents' ability to relate
their inqs to the upq is in decreasing order. On the other hand, since the agents' bids
are based on rewards and rewards are based on the upq, the bids can be related to the
upq. Thus, the agents' ability to relate their inqs to their bids is in decreasing order.
This, in turn, e®ects their balance. Speci¯cally, Figure 4.11 demonstrates that the more
strongly an agent can relate its inqs to its bids, the more pro¯t it will make.
4.4 Validating the System's Ability to Seek Out the Best
Recommendation
Having evaluated the market with respect to the metrics listed in section 3.1 and the
correlation between the inq and the upq of the recommendations, this section evaluates
the system's ability to seek out the best item from all the source recommendations. This
is clearly an important feature from the user's viewpoint, since if the system cannot
recommend the best items, the user will not use it.
To evaluate this aspect of the system, we use the ¯rst experiment discussed in sec-
tion 4.2.1 and trace the bidding price of the recommendation with the highest upq
value selected by the ¯rst agent (see Figure 4.12, in which the cross points represent
the bidding price of this particular recommendation). From this, we can see that thisChapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 75
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recommendation's bidding price keeps increasing till it converges to the ¯rst bid price
of the shortlisted items. This means that as long as the ¯rst agent chooses the highest
upq recommendation to bid in an auction round (after the market converges), this item
is always displayed in the ¯rst slot of the sidebar of the user's browser. Therefore, in
case of either user model (independent selection or search-till-satisfaction), this recom-
mendation will be selected by the user, since the ¯rst shortlisted recommendation has
the highest upq. This result shows that the system is capable of seeking out the best
recommendation and presenting it to the user.
4.5 Summary
Based on these simulations, the auction mechanism designed in Chapter 3 is shown to be
e®ective. Speci¯cally, we organized a set of consecutive auctions with nine recommender
agents to o®er their recommendations. We simulate the user with two kinds of user mod-
els: independent selection of recommendations and search till satis¯ed. We ¯nd that our
market can always converge after a number of auctions with either user model. After
convergence, the marketplace is able to give incentives of users' preferences to the rec-
ommender agents and to shortlist the best recommendations in decreasing order of their
upqs. Additionally, the marketplace gives either e®ective or ine®ective recommender
agents equal opportunity to bid their recommendations and is stable meaning that it is
able to stop greedy bidders aggressively bidding their recommendations. By simulation,
our marketplace is shown to be capable of successfully correlating the two perspectives ofChapter 4 Simulating and Evaluating the Marketplace 76
recommendation quality (internal and user perceived) and is able to identify the highest
upq item to be shortlisted at the top position of the recommendation sidebar.
This chapter has proved that the auction mechanism design developed in Chapter 3 is
feasible to coordinate multiple di®erent recommendation methods in one single system
and is able to relate their good recommendations to the user's interests. However, how
a recommender agent learns the user's interests is left to be addressed and this is the
subject of Chapter 5.Chapter 5
Learning Users' Interests
Having shown the e®ectiveness of our market mechanism as a means of coordinating
di®erent recommendation methods, an open problem from the point of view of the
individual recommender agents remains: given a set of recommendations with di®erent
inq levels, in what order should an agent try to advertise them so that it can learn
the user's interests as quickly as possible, while still maximizing its revenue? Thus, for
example, the agent could bid the items that have never been advertised to the user,
which would allow it to learn the user's interests quickly but could also result in it
losing money. Conversely, the agent could always bid those items that have been highly
rewarded, so ensuring a good return, but it would take a very long time to learn the
extent of the user's interests. To this end, this chapter reports a quality classi¯cation
mechanism and a reinforcement learning strategy we built for the recommender agents
to learn the user's interests.
This chapter contributes to the thesis in the way that a marketplace with learning
recommender agents converges quicker and seeks out the best recommendations quicker
and more frequently than that with non-learning agents. Moreover, with a learning
capability, a recommender agent is able to make a larger amount of pro¯t, while still
making good recommendations.
Speci¯cally, section 5.1 outlines the metrics over which we can evaluate our learning
strategy, section 5.2 details the learning algorithm and the exploration strategy, and
section 5.3 evaluates the learning strategy against the metrics de¯ned in section 5.1.
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these inqs to the upqs (see Figure 5.1). Intuitively, the more the user is satis¯ed with
a recommendation, the more reward the corresponding agent receives. Thus, an agent
that has su±cient experience of the user's feedback can learn the user's interests by
correlating its recommendations (and their corresponding inq segments) to the rewards
(that re°ect their upqs) they receive [Wei et al., 2003a]. This, in turn, enables a self-
interested agent to consciously make recommendations from those inq segments that
correspond to high upqs so that it can best satisfy the user and, thus, gain maximal
revenue. To e®ectively compute the agents' revenue, we de¯ne an agent's immediate
reward (made from a recommendation displayed to the user in one auction round) as
the reward it received minus the price it has paid for the advertisement1. With this, what
an agent needs to do is to learn how much immediate reward, on average, it can expect
for items in each category (i.e. each inq segment). We term this average immediate
reward for each inq segment an agent's expected revenue. Thus, a self-interested agent
can maximize its revenue by frequently bidding recommendations from the segments
with high expected revenue. Therefore, an agent's recommending task can be seen as
a quality classi¯cation problem and it needs to align the user's preferences with its inq
segments (re°ected by expected revenue) and, meanwhile, make maximal revenue [Wei
et al., 2004b,a, To appeara].
However, when an agent starts bidding in the marketplace, it has no information about
how much revenue it can expect for each segment. Therefore, the agent needs to interact
in the marketplace by taking actions over its G segments to learn this information (as per
Figure 5.1). In this way, an agent can produce a pro¯le of such information from which it
can form an optimal strategy to maximize its overall revenue. In this context, the agent's
learning behaviour is on a \trial-and-error" basis. The agent bids its recommendations
and receives the corresponding feedback in a manner that good recommendations gain
rewards, whereas bad ones attract a loss. This kind of trial-and-error learning behaviour
is exactly what happens in Reinforcement Learning [Mitchell, 1997]. Thus, to be more
concrete, an agent needs an algorithm to learn the expected revenue over each segment.
In addition, it also needs an exploration strategy to make trials on its G segments such
1Agents pay nothing for items they put forward that are not displayed to the user (this occurs when
other agents are willing to pay more to advertise their recommendations). By de¯nition, an immediate
reward may either be positive or negative. If a displayed recommendation is not selected by the user or
if it has paid too much to display an item, the corresponding agent's immediate reward is negative since
it has paid for the display and received less reward.Chapter 5 Learning Users' Interests 81
that it strikes a balance between learning as quickly as possible, while still maximizing
revenue.
5.2.2 The Q-Learning Algorithm
In chapters 3 and 4, we have proved (theoretically and empirically) that our marketplace
enables an agent to relate the rewards it received to its G inq segments. Building on this
basis, the contribution of this chapter is in how to e®ectively learn the expected revenue
that is likely to accrue over its G segments. Such a strategy is desirable because high
expected revenue on a speci¯c segment implies that more rewards can be expected if it
repeats bidding on that segment in future. Therefore, this subsection aims to address
the problem of producing the expected revenue pro¯le over an agent's G segments, while
still trading pro¯tably in the marketplace.
In detail, an agent needs to execute a set of actions (bidding on its G segments,
a1;a2;¢¢¢ ;aG), to learn the expected revenue of each segment (R(ai), i 2 [1::G]). Specif-
ically, an action ai that results in its recommendation being displayed to the user must
pay some amount of credit. Then, it may or may not receive an amount of reward (de-
pending on whether its recommendation satis¯es the user). We record the tth immediate
reward that ai has received as ri;t (t = 1;2;¢¢¢). From a statistical perspective, the ex-
pected revenue can be obtained from the mean value of the series of discrete immediate
reward values:
E[R(ai)] = lim
t!1
(
1
t
X
t
ri;t) : (5.1)
In this context, the Q-learning technique provides a well established way of estimating
the optimality [Mitchell, 1997]. In particular, we use a standard Q-learning algorithm
to estimate R(ai) by learning the mean value of the immediate rewards:
^ Qi := (1 ¡
1
t
) ¢ ^ Qi +
1
t
¢ ri;t ; (5.2)
where ^ Qi is the current estimation of R(ai), and 1
t is the learning rate that controls
how much weight is given to the immediate reward (as opposed to the old estimation).
As 1
t decreases, ^ Qi builds up an average of all experiences, and the odd new unusual
experience, ri;t, does not signi¯cantly a®ect the established ^ Qi. As t approaches in¯nity,Chapter 5 Learning Users' Interests 83
hold in our context2. Speci¯cally, the number of times that an agent can interact with
the marketplace is not limited. Thus, the agent can gather as much information as it
wants in order to form its expected revenue pro¯le. Knowing how much can be expected
through each action, an agent can use a probabilistic approach to select actions based on
the law of e®ect [Thorndike, 1898]: choices that have led to good outcomes in the past are
more likely to be repeated in the future. To this end, a Boltzmann exploration strategy
¯ts our context well; it ensures the agent exploits higher ^ Q value actions with higher
probability, whereas it explores lower ^ Q value actions with lower probability [Kaelbling
et al., 1996]. The probability of taking action ai is formally de¯ned as:
Pai =
e
^ Qi=T
PG
j=1 e
^ Qj=T (T > 0); (5.3)
where T is a system variable that controls the priority of action selection. In practice,
as the agent's experience increases and all ^ Qis tend to converge, the agent's knowledge
approaches optimality. Thus, T can be decreased such that the agent chooses fewer
actions with small ^ Qi values (meaning trying not to lose credits) and chooses more
actions with large ^ Qi values (meaning trying to gain credits).
In practice, however, we have observed that the learning algorithm of equation (5.2)
accompanied with the exploration strategy of equation (5.3) has a problem of producing
bias from the optimal and very little work has been done to address this. This problem
occurs when an agent obtains a very small negative ^ Qi value for a particular action in
its ¯rst few trials3. If this happens, a bias from the true expected revenue of this action
may occur (since the action may in general produce positive R(ai)) and the agent will
seldom choose it. This kind of bias is a particular problem in our system. This is because
a user may not always visit all displayed items in the sidebar and, thus, some good
recommendations may be skipped and, therefore, be deemed bad ones. To avoid such
bias, T needs to be assigned a very large value in the beginning of learning to limit the
exploration priority given to those actions with very large ^ Q values. However, controlling
2In fact, it is hard to ¯nd the absolutely best strategy for most complex problems. In reinforcement
learning practice, therefore, approaches tend to be developed for speci¯c contexts. They solve the
problems in question in a reasonable and computationally tractable manner, although they are often
not the absolutely optimal choice [Kaelbling et al., 1996].
3A negative immediate reward means punishment and an erroneous action. A reward of zero means
that the action has received no feedback. Thus, actions with negative, zero and positive feedback are
di®erentiated and exploration priority should be given to the latter two.Chapter 5 Learning Users' Interests 84
T in terms of producing the unbiased optimal strategy is hard to achieve, since di®erent
actions' ^ Qs converge with di®erent speeds and their convergence is di±cult to detect.
Even with other exploration strategies, such biases still exist since no exploration can
avoid such unlucky trials at the beginning of learning. To this end, we developed an
algorithm that takes positive initial ^ Qi values into account to overcome this problem.
We detail this in the next section.
5.2.4 The Overall Strategy
To overcome the impact of bias in the beginning of learning, we use positive initial ^ Q
values (i.e. ^ Qi;0) and make them a®ect the learning. Thus, instead of algorithm (5.2),
we use the following learning algorithm:
^ Qi := (1 ¡
1
t0 + t
) ¢ ^ Qi +
1
t0 + t
¢ ri;t : (5.4)
The di®erence between (5.2) and (5.4) is that the former does not take ^ Qi;0 into account,
whereas the latter does. Speci¯cally, algorithm (5.4) assumes that each action has been
experienced t0 (t0 is positive and ¯nite) times and each time with a feedback of ^ Qi;0
( ^ Qi;0 À 0) before the agent starts learning. This, in turn, removes the problem discussed
in section 5.2.3. Indeed, if an action causes a negative immediate reward in the beginning,
it does not force its ^ Qi to become negative. In this way, all actions will still be allocated
a relatively equal opportunity of being explored as an agent begins learning. As the
agent continues to interact with the marketplace, its ^ Qis update gradually to di®erent
levels and these levels still make its exploration follow the law of e®ect. Thus, the agent's
exploitation tends to optimality with its ^ Q values tending to converge. Additionally, by
initializing ^ Q with positive values, the exploration does not need a sophisticated control
on T, since a relatively small positive value is su±cient and is easier to control. Moreover,
the change from (5.2) to (5.4) does not a®ect the convergence (as proved below)4.
Proposition:
Given ^ Qi's de¯nition by algorithm (5.4), its convergence to E[R(ai)] is independent of
its initial value ^ Qi;0 and initial time t0 .
4However the time it takes to converge is extended slightly depending on the values of ^ Q0 and t0 (the
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5.3 Evaluation
This section reports on the experiments to evaluate the learning strategy we have devel-
oped. Section 5.3.1 outlines the experimental settings, whereas section 5.3.2 evaluates
the learning strategy against the metrics de¯ned in section 5.1.
5.3.1 Experimental Settings
We assume that there are four good recommendation methods (able to correlate their
inqs to the upq) and four poor ones (unable to do so). Given a speci¯c recommendation
(Rec), the correlations of its upq to a good method's inq (INQg) and to a poor one's
(INQp) are described in equations (5.5) and (5.6) respectively (again \" means \has
no relation to"):
UPQ(Rec) = INQg(Rec) § 0:1 ¢ random() (5.5)
UPQ(Rec)  INQp(Rec) (5.6)
where random() returns a random value that follows a uniform distribution within the
range [0, 1.0). This random value can be seen as the noise between the inq and the upq.
All upq and inq values are ¯xed within [0, 1.0). In each auction round, the marketplace
calls for ten bids. Again we use an independent-selection user model to decide which
recommendations displayed to the user will be rewarded (see section 4.1.3). In this
model, selecting one item is independent of selecting another and all recommendations
with a upq higher than a particular threshold will be rewarded. Here, we set this
threshold to 0.75. To correlate their inqs to the upqs, all agents divide their inq
range into G = 20 equal segments. We assume that all agents share the same set of
recommendations and each agent has at least ten items in each segment. Before starting
to bid, Qinit is set to 250, T = 200 and t0 = 1 for all agents. All agents are initially
endowed with same amount of credit (65536). At the beginning, each agent will bid the
same (128) for items from any segment, since it does not know which segments are more
valuable than others.Chapter 5 Learning Users' Interests 87
5.3.2 Simulating and Evaluating the Strategy
Having outlined the con¯guration of the agents, this section details the evaluations.
The results shown in this section are for a single simulation run. However, to ensure
these results are typical for our system, we repeated the experiments for two hundred
simulation trials. Thus, the results we will show and discuss are representative of the
outcomes. Speci¯cally, over the two hundred simulations, we found that: in 78.1% of
the trials the good recommendation methods' ^ Qs converge; all good recommendation
methods with converged ^ Q pro¯les make a signi¯cantly greater amount of credit (38.3%
on average); a marketplace with learning agents takes 59.4% less time to converge than
one without; and the number of best recommendations that a learning market is able to
identify is, on average, 2.73 times that of a market without learning capability.
Among all the properties that we want the learning strategy to exhibit, ^ Q convergence
is the most important. Indeed, in its absence, an agent loses its basis to reason (see
section 5.1). Thus, we will start with experiments on the convergence of ^ Q values.
5.3.2.1 Convergence to Optimality
To evaluate an agent's ^ Q value convergence, we arranged 300 consecutive auctions.
Among the eight agents, the ¯rst four employ the good recommendation method and
the last four employ the poor one. We ¯nd that, with a good method, an agent's ^ Q
values always converge such that high inq segments' ^ Qs (corresponding to high upq
because of equation (5.5)) converge to high values and low inq segments' ^ Qs converge to
low values (see Fig. 5.3(a)). Speci¯cally, the ^ Q values of those inq segments correspond-
ing to the upqs above the user's satisfaction threshold (0.75) converge proportionally to
their corresponding upqs. The higher the corresponding upq, the higher the ^ Qi's con-
vergence value, because the recommendations from a segment corresponding to higher
upqs receive more immediate reward than those corresponding to lower upqs. The ^ Q
values of those segments that correspond to the upqs below 0.75 converge to negative
values, since they do not receive rewards if their recommendations are displayed. More-
over, the convergence is independent of the speci¯c form of equation (5.5). Speci¯cally,
once there is a unique upq level corresponding to each inq level (even high inq corre-
sponding to low upq), the ^ Q value of an inq segment corresponding to a high upq willChapter 5 Learning Users' Interests 88
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Figure 5.3: Q-Learning Convergence
always converge to a high level (since it induces high immediate rewards). However,
with a poor method, an agent's ^ Q values cannot converge such that high inq segments'
^ Qs converge to high values (see Fig. 5.3(b)). This is because a speci¯c inq corresponds
to very di®erent upqs (and very di®erent immediate rewards) at di®erent times because
of equation (5.6).
To exemplify that our learning algorithm (5.4) overcomes the bias problem that may
occur in (5.2), we organized another set of experiments with all agents taking zero initial
^ Qi values and all other settings remained unchanged (see Fig. 5.3(c)). From Fig. 5.3(c),
we can see that ^ Q12 is updated only once and with a large negative value of -82 (this
gives the corresponding action virtually no chance of being selected in future). ^ Q16
also produces a bias in the beginning. In even worse cases, ^ Q16 can never update itselfChapter 5 Learning Users' Interests 89
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Figure 5.4: Recommenders' Balance
like ^ Q12 (however, it should actually have a positive expected revenue). However, with
positive initial ^ Qi values, such biases do not occur (see Fig. 5.3(a)).
5.3.2.2 Individual Rationality
The agents with good methods are able to know what recommendations better satisfy
the user. Therefore, they can achieve more immediate rewards. Thus, good recommen-
dations are raised more frequently by a learning agent than by a non-learning one. This,
in turn, means learning agents can maximize their revenue by selecting good recommen-
dations. In particular, Fig. 5.4 shows that good recommendation methods with learning
capability (the ¯rst four agents in Fig. 5.4(a)) make, on average, signi¯cantly greater
amounts (about 43%) of credit than those without (the ¯rst four agents in Fig. 5.4(b)).
With a poor method, the agents cannot relate their bids to the user's interest and there-
fore bid randomly. Thus, they cannot consistently achieve positive immediate rewards
and their revenue is low (the last four agents in Fig. 5.4 (a) and (b)).
5.3.2.3 Quick Market Convergence
We have shown that market convergence enables the agents to know what prices to bid
for recommendations relating to certain upqs so as to gain maximal revenue in Chapter 4.
Thus, quick market convergence lets agents reach this state quickly. To evaluate this, weChapter 5 Learning Users' Interests 90
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Figure 5.5: Market Convergence
organized two sets of experiments (using the same settings as the experiments assessing
the convergence). The ¯rst one contains all learning agents and the other contains none.
We ¯nd that a marketplace with learning agents always converges quicker than the one
without. From Fig. 5.5, we can see that a marketplace with learning agents (Fig. 5.5(a))
converges after about 40 auctions, whereas one without (Fig. 5.5(b)) converges after
about 120 auctions. Indeed, as the learning agents' ^ Q pro¯les converge, more high
quality recommendations are consistently suggested (since their high ^ Q values induce
high probability for the agent to bid these items because of equation (5.3)) and low
quality ones are deterred. This, in turn, accelerates e®ective price iterations to chase
the market equilibrium. It takes approximately one third of the time for a market with
learning agents to chase the equilibrium compared to one without.Chapter 5 Learning Users' Interests 91
5.3.2.4 Best Recommendation's Identi¯cation
To evaluate the learning strategy's ability to identify the best recommendation (from
the viewpoint of the user, i.e. the top upq item) quickly and bid it consistently, we
use the same set of experiments that were used to assess market convergence. We then
trace the top upq item highlighted by a randomly selected learning agent with a good
recommendation method and a corresponding one from a non-learning agent in Fig. 5.5
(a) and (b) respectively. We do this by plotting this top upq items' bidding prices
with circle points in the ¯gures. To clearly display the points of the trace and not to
damage the quality of lines (representing the three displayed bids), we do not display
the points when this item is raised by other agents. From Fig. 5.5(a), we can see that
this item's bidding price keeps increasing till it converges to the ¯rst bid price of the
displayed items. This means that as long as the randomly selected agent chooses this
particular item to bid in an auction (after the market converges), it is always displayed
in the top position displayed to the user. However, in contrast, this phenomenon in
a market without learning agents proceeds slowly (see Fig. 5.5(b)). This means that
a learning market can satisfy the user quicker than a non-learning one. Additionally,
a learning market raises the best recommendation more frequently (39 times by the
selected learning agent, see Fig. 5.5(a)) than a market without learning capability (13
times by the corresponding non-learning agent, see Fig. 5.5(b)).
5.4 Summary
This chapter presents the learning problem that a recommender agent faces in our mar-
ketplace. Speci¯cally, the agent needs to classify its recommendations into di®erent inq
categories and to quickly identify and frequently suggest those categories that highly
interest a user so as to maximize its revenue, while still satisfying the user. By sim-
ulating and evaluating our Q-learning strategy, we show that the strategy can always
come to the optimal solution, is able to quickly identify the e®ective inq categories and
frequently suggest items from these categories, and enables the agents to make more
revenue than those without a learning capability.Chapter 5 Learning Users' Interests 92
In sum, this chapter has developed a reinforcement learning algorithm and a Boltzmann
exploration strategy for the recommender agents to learn the users' interests. This chap-
ter has also proved the e®ectiveness of recommender agents using the learning strategy
in our marketplace. With this learning capability, our marketplace converges quicker
and suggests the best items more quickly and frequently than without it.Chapter 6
User Evaluations of the
Recommender System
With the marketplace designed, simulated and formally analyzed, we now need to eval-
uate the feasibility and the e±ciency with real users of our market-based approach to
recommender systems. To do this, we implemented a market-based recommender system
that incorporates three typically-used recommendation methods (content-based, collab-
orative and demographic). We then arranged for a number of people (thirty-one in this
case) to use our system so that we could record various aspects of their interactions
and the system's outputs. These records were then analyzed in order to provide a user
evaluation of the e±ciency of our system.
With the user evaluations of our system, we have shown that (i) multiple constituent rec-
ommenders contribute to the recommendations that are placed in front of users through
the marketplace, (ii) the marketplace converges with respect to most of the users, (iii)
the market-based recommender's top recommendation is the best item of those suggested
by whatever constituent recommenders for most of the users most of the time, and (iv)
the marketplace is able to seek out the best recommendations for a given user most of
the time and place these among the top positions in the recommendation sidebar most
of the time. By undertaking these user trials, this chapter contributes to the thesis by
showing that the market-based approach is capable in practice (as well as in theory)
of coordinating multiple recommendation methods and e®ectively identifying the best
recommendations quickly and frequently.
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the rating value range of recommendations). As discussed in section 4.4, we want
our system to be able to identify and frequently suggest the best recommendations
to users. To evaluate this, we de¯ne two measurements: quali¯ed recommending
round and satis¯ed recommending round. Speci¯cally, with respect to a particular
user, a quali¯ed recommending round means an auction round with at least one
best recommendation displayed in any advertisement slot of the recommendation
sidebar, whereas a satis¯ed recommending round means an auction round with
at least one best recommendation displayed in any of the ¯rst two advertisement
slots. Thus, a satis¯ed recommending round must be a quali¯ed recommending
round, but a quali¯ed recommending round may not be a satis¯ed recommending
round. With these two measurements, we evaluate how the numbers of quali¯ed
and satis¯ed recommending rounds, with respect to a given user, are compared to
the total number of recommending rounds.
With these metrics in place, we now outline the user trial process.
6.2 User Trials
In this section, we outline the process of the trial from the perspective of a user of our
system. In using our system, a user is required to choose a speci¯c browsing topic,
browse a set of recommended web documents on that chosen topic, and then rate each
document according to how it satis¯es him. The user's task can be segmented into two
stages: building an interest pro¯le and then browsing and rating the recommendations.
The °owchart in Figure 6.1 depicts these two stages and the remainder of this subsection
elaborates on the details involved.
Our evaluation involves thirty-one e®ective user trials from the School of Electronics
and Computer Science at the University of Southampton. The user population covers
PhD students, post-doctoral researchers and academic sta® and they are all researchers
in the Intelligence Agents Multimedia Group (IAM Group). In particular, most of
them are researchers in the areas of \agents", \arti¯cial intelligence", \machine learn-
ing", \knowledge technologies", \automated negotiation", \auctions", \game theory"
and \hypermedia".Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 100
Figure 6.2: Selecting Browsing Topic and Telling Research Interests
To start using our recommender system, each user needs to build up a user pro¯le of
his interests, based on which, our system suggests its recommendations. There are four
steps in the user pro¯ling stage (as per the upper part of Figure 6.1). In the ¯rst step,
a user needs to select a browsing topic. Here a browsing topic is an interesting topic
that a user chooses as his browsing context throughout his browsing and rating task
(i.e. the whole trial). Figure 6.2 shows a screenshot of an example of choosing browsing
topics when a user faces our system. As shown in the upper corner of the sidebar of
Figure 6.2, a dropdown box comprises three predetermined topics for a user to choose.
They are: Agents, Automated Negotiation and Machine Learning. The three topics are
chosen according to the most popular research topics within the IAM Group based on
an email survey of the thirty-one people.
In order to recommend good documents, the system needs to learn the users' interests.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 101
Thus, each constituent recommender needs to build a user pro¯le as the basis to com-
pute its recommendations2. Since it is a di±cult and complex process to precisely and
automatically pro¯le a user's interests [Middleton et al., 2004] and because it is not the
main focus of this work, we decided to pro¯le users' interests in a straightforward way as
follows. From step 2 to step 4 in Figure 6.1, three kinds of user interest pro¯les are built
(one for each of the three recommendation methods). In the remaining phase of the trial
described as the \recommending and browsing stage" in Figure 6.1, a user is required
to rate a set of keywords that may be relevant to his research interests in the ¯eld of
computer science. These words are3: agents, biorobotics, arti¯cial intelligence, machine
learning, knowledge technologies, automated negotiation, auctions, markets, game the-
ory, e-commerce, semantics, software engineering, information processing, distributed
computing, grid, web services, networks, security, trust, mobility, ontologies and hyper-
media. The user is required to rate all these topics according to how important they
are to his research interests (see the dropdown boxes in the lower part of the sidebar in
Figure 6.2 for part of the twenty-two topics). A rating number is limited to the range
between \0" and \10": \0" indicates totally irrelevant, \1" indicates weakly relevant and
\10" indicates perfectly relevant. Based on the ratings of these topics, two user pro¯les
for collaborative and demographic recommendation methods are built respectively (see
sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 for more details about these two methods). To produce pro¯le
for the content-based method, the system randomly recommends six web documents on
the user's chosen browsing topic and displays their corresponding urls in the browser
sidebar (see Figure 6.3). We term these recommended urls in the pro¯ling stage the
2With respect to a speci¯c user, because di®erent constituent recommenders compute their recom-
mendations independently and use their user pro¯les in their own ways, we need to build each recom-
mendation method a separate user pro¯le.
3This list was produced by performing an email survey on the most popular research topics within the
IAM Group of the University of Southampton. Speci¯cally, we ask people to provide a list of topics that
represent their main research interests. We received thirty-four responses. Among all these responses,
twenty-two topics appear in at least three responses, whereas the remaining ones rarely appear. Thus,
the twenty-two topics are used in our experiment to pro¯le a user's interests. These interest topics
are related to the three predetermined browsing topics in the following manner. Only three topics are
insu±cient to de¯ne good correlations between users. To accurately compute di®erent users' correlations,
more interest topics de¯ne more accuracy. Thus, we use a larger number of topics to specify a user's
interests. Therefore, these topics can be seen as an extension of the three predetermined browsing
topics. Actually the three browsing topics can be extended to the same set of interest topics. However,
in so doing, we need to prepare a huge number of source recommendation web documents. But it is
not our concern in this research to recommend as many interest topics and prepare as many source
recommendations as possible. Thus, we select only a few of most popular ones as the browsing topics
to do our experiment.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 102
Figure 6.3: Rating Predetermined urls
predetermined urls4. The user is then required to browse all these predetermined urls
and give each a rating according to his personal opinion (how a user rates recommen-
dations is detailed in the end of this section). With these ratings to recommendations,
the content-based recommender collects a couple of the most interesting documents and
analyzes their contents to produce its user pro¯le. To capture the user's actual interests,
three positive-rated urls are needed. If less than three positive-rated urls collected in
the third and fourth step, steps three and four are repeated until three have been col-
lected. Based on these most interested Web documents, a user pro¯le for content-based
recommendation method is produced (see section 6.3.2 for more details about how the
content-based method helps recommendations).
After the pro¯ling stage, a user starts his main browsing and rating stage (the last three
steps in Figure 6.1). In this stage, the user is each time suggested ¯ve Web documents
4The predetermined urls are randomly selected from a separate recommendation pool, whereas the
three constituent recommenders have their own recommendation pools. These four recommendation
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(step 5 in Figure 6.1). The user is required to browse and give each a rating according
to how relevant it is to his research interests (step 6 in Figure 6.1).
For example, a user has a list of ¯ve interest topics (Agents, 6), (machine learning,
4), (auctions, 7), (markets, 9) and (information processing, 10) (numbers
represent their relevance) and seventeen other topics with zero relevance. The user
chooses \agents" as his browsing topic and is recommended two Web documents in this
broad area. Speci¯cally, one document is on a topic of \using market-based mechanism
to coordinate information agents", whereas the other is on \mobile agent's security over
the Internet". Thus, the user should rate the former higher than the latter. This is
because, besides agents, the former is related to markets and information processing
which are also the user's interests, whereas the latter relates to mobility and security
which are not. For another example with respect to the same user, a third Web document
is suggested on a topic of \agents and machine learning". In this case, the user should
prefer the ¯rst recommendation to this one because machine learning is less relevant
than markets and information processing.
Therefore, a rating to a recommendation Web document is a user's personal opinion
about how well it relates to his research interests. A rating number is limited to
\0" to \5" (see the dropdown box below each predetermined url in Figure 6.3), in
which, \0" means totally irrelevant, \1" means weakly relevant and \5" means perfectly
relevant. We use ¯ve positive levels to specify recommendation quality because this
number has previously proved to be su±cient and e®ective in di®erentiating users' pref-
erences [Resnick et al., 1994, Shardanand and Maes, 1995, Pazzani, 1999]5. Actually,
these rating numbers represent the upqs of the recommendations by de¯nition. A user's
rating number of each recommendation is an absolute value throughout his trial. Thus,
if a recommendation is rated by the user in an earlier time, he is required not to change
its rating value. Therefore, a user's evaluation criterion of the qualities of recommenda-
tions should be consistent throughout his task. With these ratings to recommendations,
the system rewards the relevant constituent recommenders to assist their learning about
the user's interests (step 7 in Figure 6.1). We term the subroutine of recommending,
5We use more levels to de¯ne the importance of interest topics because more levels de¯ne more
accuracy of users' correlations. To avoid too much computation, ten levels are used.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 104
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Figure 6.4: Con¯gurations of the Market-Based Recommender System
browsing/rating and rewarding a recommending round (step 5 to 7 of Figure 6.1). Each
user is required to do ¯fteen rounds to complete his trial.
Knowing what the users are required to do, we then outline how the system suggests
recommendations in terms of three component recommendation methods.
6.3 System Con¯guration
This section describes the con¯guration of our market-based recommender system (Fig-
ure 6.4 depicts its architecture). This section is organized into four main parts: con¯g-
uration of the marketplace (section 6.3.1), and the details of the three di®erent compo-
nent recommendation methods (section 6.3.2 to 6.3.4). We choose a number of di®erent
recommendation methods since one of the goals of our system is to be able to incor-
porate and coordinate various recommendation methods and seek out the best items
from whichever source is most appropriate (see section 1.1). Speci¯cally, we use three
di®erent methods that compute the inqs of their recommendations based on di®erent
similarity measures:
² one based on similarity between the current document and those the user has
previously indicated as being of interest (i.e. a typical content-based method);
² one based on the correlations between the user's interests and those of other users'
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² one based on the similarity between the available documents and the user's pro¯le
as represented by their keyword topics of interest (i.e. a variation of the typical
demographic method6).
Therefore, our three component recommendation methods are based on three di®erent
similarity measures: document-to-document, user-to-user, and document-to-user. Be-
fore we detail the con¯gurations of these component methods, however, we brie°y outline
the settings of the marketplace that coordinates these methods.
6.3.1 Marketplace Con¯guration
This section outlines the con¯gurations of all system variables with respect to the mar-
ketplace de¯ned in Chapters 3 and 5. We discuss them in the same order as they
appeared in the two chapters.
The following four variables are de¯ned in section 3.2. They are brie°y described and
con¯gured as below.
² S represents the number of constituent recommenders that are incorporated in our
marketplace. Thus, S = 3 because we have three constituent recommenders.
² Tb represents the duration of marketplace calling for bids. We set Tb = 5 seconds
because, in practice, we ¯nd that ¯ve seconds allows su±cient time for the three
constituent recommenders to compute their recommendations in most cases.
² M represents the number of recommendations that the marketplace calls for in
each auction round. We set M = 5 because ¯ve recommendations do not over-
burden the users and ¯ve is a practical number in terms of the trials.
6A typical demographic method analyzes the characteristics of people (such as age, gender and
occupation) and groups people with similar characteristics. Then, it analyzes the attributes of recom-
mendations (such as textual descriptions or contents of books, colour of material of clothes and price
of products), and, ¯nally, matches people with certain characteristics to recommendations with suitable
attributes. We do not analyze people's characteristics by age, gender and the like, but by their research
interests since what we recommend are only Web documents that are relevant to a particular set of
interesting topics. Thus, we group people by characteristics of their interesting topics and match people
to documents with relevant topics. We do not consider this method a content-based one though it also
analyzes the textual contents of documents. Rather, we consider it a demographic method. This is
because content-based method compute similarities between documents, whereas this method computes
similarity between the characteristics of people and the attributes of recommendations. For example,
a group of people share the interest topic of \machine learning", thus, all of them would probably be
interested in documents related to reinforcement learning.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 107
do not know these ¯xed equilibrium price values, a marketplace with a set of ¯xed
equilibrium prices does not a®ect their bidding strategies.
² PM+1 represents the highest bidding price that is not shortlisted in one auction
round. It is the basic unit reward and it controls the amount of actual reward to
an agent together with ±. Like setting ¹ Ph with constant values, we set PM+1 = 100
in order to give quick and clear incentives to recommenders (because constant unit
reward makes it easier for recommenders to learn the bidding price deviations from
the equilibria).
The last system variable we need to discuss was de¯ned in section 5.2 for agents to learn
users' interests.
² G represents the number of inq segments of a constituent recommender. In prac-
tice, based on our computation of the inqs of the recommendations of our three
constituent recommenders (detailed in sections 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4), we ¯nd that
six segments are su±cient to e®ectively di®erentiate recommendations in terms of
inq. Thus, we set G = 6 for our three constituent recommenders.
6.3.2 The Content-Based Method's Con¯guration
A content-based method suggests recommendations based on the contents of a user's
previously top rated documents. Therefore, before it can start recommending, this
method needs to learn something about documents that the user thinks are valuable.
In our case this is the purpose of the system collecting at least three positively rated
predetermined urls in the user-pro¯ling stage (see Figure 6.1). To this end, the top
rated document of the three is chosen as the initial basis for this method since this is
the one the user currently likes best. Thus this method recommends web documents
based on their similarity to the top rated predetermined url. In the recommending and
browsing stage (see Figure 6.1), if subsequent Web pages with even higher ratings areChapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 108
uncovered, then these become the basis for recommending based on content. If there is
more than one page with the same highest rating value, all of them are used7.
To be more precise, let P1, P2, ¢¢¢, PNc be the Nc (Nc 6 3) previously rated di®erent
Web pages with the same top rating value Rv. Then let PP be a potential Web document
to be recommended. Now, the internal quality of this potential Web page is computed
by the similarity between the Nc top rated pages and itself:
INQcon(PP) =
1
Nc
X
i
Similarity(PP;Pi) ¤ Rv (6.2)
In Equation 6.2, the subscript of the function is used to di®erentiate it from the other two
methods introduced in sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4. The similarity measure will be formally
discussed in the end of this subsection. Thus, the content-based method compares
the source recommendation web pages to previously top rated pages and recommends
those with high similarity values. To compute the similarity value, we extract ¯fteen
keywords with the highest term frequency (TF) from each document8. Actually, the
more keywords extracted the more accurate they are able to stand for a document.
However, extracting a large number of keywords induces much computation and a®ects
the e±ciency of recommending. In practice, therefore, we ¯nd that ¯fteen frequently
occurring keywords are able to cover the meaning that a document delivers in most
cases. Thus, a source web page is represented as a ¯fteen-dimensional term vector
(for reasons of computational simplicity we do not use more keywords). The similarity
measure of two web pages is then computed using the standard technique of considering
the cosine between two vectors with a result value between 0 and 1.0, where 0 indicates
not strongly related and 1.0 indicates very strongly related [Salton, 1989]. These ¯fteen
most frequently occurring words are then stored in a Content-Based Recommendation
Table (see Table 6.1 for part of the actual table we use). Likewise, the predetermined
urls are prepared with the ¯fteen most frequently occurring terms and their TFs in a
7We seek to use a common one for each of the three typical kinds of recommendation method (i.e.
content-based, collaborative and demographic) described in Chapter 2. However, we do not aim to re¯ne
each method to a perfect one because we are not aiming to build perfect information ¯ltering methods
and this is not our main concern in this work.
8To extract the most frequently occurring keywords from a web document, a lookup table is used
to ¯lter out unimportant words that do not make sense in our context and need to be ignored (such
as \a", \the", \in", \that" and \and"). This look up table is constructed according to Middleton's
work [Middleton, 2003]. Meanwhile, a stop-list technique also taken from Middleton's work is used to
match di®erent words with the same meaning. For example, \negotiation", \negotiations", \negotiating"
and \negotiated" are tokenized into \negotiat" and are all deemed the same word.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 109
Table 6.1: The Content-Based Recommendation Table
Table 6.2: The Predetermined URL Table
Predetermined URL Table in the similar style (see Table 6.2 for part of the actual table
we use). As stated in section 6.2, the contents of the Predetermined URL Table do not
overlap those in the Content-base Recommendation Table, nor do they with the source
recommendation tables presented in the subsequent two recommendation methods (see
sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4).
From the Content-Based Recommendation Table, we can see that each potential Web
document is represented by a record of that table. Each record contains a vector of
¯fteen dimensions decided by the ¯fteen keywords and each dimension has a value of the
keyword's TF. With respect to a speci¯c record, ki represents the ith most frequently
occuring keyword in a document and wi represents the times it occurs (i.e. the TF).
With this representation, we are going to formally discuss the similarity measure of
two Web documents. Assuming Px and Py are two di®erent documents and they each
have ¯fteen keywords that are the same (k1;k2;¢¢¢ ;k15). Thus, the two documents can
be represented by two vectors in the same ¯fteen-dimensional Euclidean space: x =
(w1;w2;¢¢¢ ;w15) and y = (w0
1;w0
2;¢¢¢ ;w0
15) where wi and w0
i are their keyword ki's TFs
respectively. The inq of Px is de¯ned as the cosine of the two term vectors of Px andChapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 110
Py [Salton, 1989]:
Similarity(Px;Py) = cos(x;y)
=
x £ y
jxj ¢ jyj
=
P15
i=1(wi ¢ w0
i)
qP15
i=1(wi)2 ¢
qP15
i=1(w0
i)2
;
(6.3)
where x £ y is the inner product of x and y, and jxj = (x £ x)
1
2 is the Euclidean norm
of x. However, in many cases, two vectors share only a few keywords (less than ¯fteen
or even none). In these cases, the inner product of the two vectors cannot be computed
directly, since they are not in the same Euclidean space. Therefore, both vectors will
be converted into the same space such that their cosine similarity is computable. For
example, a di®erent Web page Py0 contains ¯fteen most frequently appeared keywords
(k1;k2;k0
3;¢¢¢ ;k0
15), where ki 6= k0
i;i 2 [3::15] compared to that of Px. Py0 can be
represented by its TF vector as y0 = (w?
1;w?
2;¢¢¢ ;w?
15) (no weighting value is zero).
Thus, Py0 shares only the ¯rst two keywords with Px. In this case, the similarity between
Px and Py0 is simpli¯ed as:
Similarity(Px;Py0) = cos(x;y0)
=
w1 ¢ w?
1 + w2 ¢ w?
2 qP15
i=1(wi)2 ¢
qP15
i=1(w?
i)2
:
(6.4)
6.3.3 The Collaborative Method's Con¯guration
We use a standard collaborative method based upon Pazzani's model (see section 2.1.4).
This method computes recommendations based on other users' ratings to the current
item. Assuming Ns users (ui;i 2 [1::Ns]) have similar interests with the active user (u)
and their ratings for a potential recommendation web page (Pp) are Ri;i 2 [1::Ns], the
prediction of the inq of Pp is de¯ned as
INQcol(Pp) =
PNs
i=1(°u;ui £ Ri)
PNs
i=1 °u;ui
; (6.5)
where °u;ui represents the Pearson-° collaborative correlation [Shardanand and Maes,
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However, before discussing how to compute Pearson-° correlation between two users,
we need a way of representing users' interests. With the users' interests pro¯le based
on ratings for twenty-two interest topics (see section 6.2), a user can be represented as
a 22-dimensional vector of these topics. For example (the sequence of these 22 ¯elds is
in the same order among all users), a vector of (8, 0, 10, 0, ¢¢¢) represents a user whose
interests are related to those topics with positive ¯eld values (such as agents, arti¯cial
intelligence, ¢¢¢ in this case) and not related to any topics with a ¯eld value of \0".
Thus, the positive ¯eld values represent the extent to which their corresponding topics
are relevant. With this in place, we can illustrate the correlation between two di®erent
users as follows. Given two users represented as two user vectors u = (u1;u2;¢¢¢ ;u22)
and v = (v1;v2;¢¢¢ ;v22), their Pearson-° correlation is de¯ned as
°u;v =
P22
i=1(ui ¡ ¹ u) ¢ (vi ¡ ¹ v)
qP22
i=1(ui ¡ ¹ u)2 ¢
P22
i=1(vi ¡ ¹ v)2
; (6.6)
where ¹ u = 1
22
P22
i=1 ui and ¹ v = 1
22
P22
i=1 vi. The user vectors are stored in the User Pro¯le
Table (see Table 6.3 for an example of the actual table we use). The recommendation
Web pages are stored in the Collaborative Recommendation Table. This table has
the same structure as that of the Content-Based Recommendation Table which we do
not show in a separate table here. In the Collaborative Recommendation Table, the
¯fteen most frequently occurring keywords and their TFs are used to solve the cold
start problem that bedevils this approach (see the subsequent paragraph). The users'
ratings for each recommendation Web document are stored in the Rating Table (see
Table 6.4 for part of the actual table we use).
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Table 6.4: The Rating Table
Column \userID" in this table corresponds to column \ID" in the User Pro¯le Table, whereas Column
\recID" corresponds to column \RecID" in the Collaborative Recommendation Table. For example, the
¯rst record in this table represents the fact that user \22" gives a rating \3" to a Web document that
stored in the Collaborative Recommendation Table with a RecID of \104".
To make the collaborative recommendation method work e®ectively in our system, we
need to overcome the cold start problem. As discussed in section 2.1, when the ¯rst few
users start to use the system, the system is unlikely to have any other users with similar
interests. Thus, it will have no users' ratings for any of the source recommendation
web pages from which to predict their inqs for the active user. To solve this prob-
lem, a \collaboration via contents" technique is used to predict the inq of the source
recommendations (see section 2.1.4). Thus, for each potential web page selected for rec-
ommendation, a rating value within the range of [0..5] is assigned by the ¯ltering agent
through computing the number of keywords shared between the document and the user's
interests (see the demographic method in Section 6.3.4 for more details). Thus, when
there are an insu±cient number of similar users, it is still possible to predict their inqs
using this method.
6.3.4 The Demographic Method's Con¯guration
The third kind of recommendation method we use is introduced based on document-user
correlation. This method directly measures how a recommended Web page's content is
related to a user's interests [Moreau et al., 2002]. Speci¯cally, this method computes
the number of keywords in a user's interest pro¯le (see Table 6.3) that overlap with
a document's ¯fteen most frequently occuring keywords (as per section 6.3.2). In thisChapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 114
standard deviation is de¯ned by:
¾x =
sPn
i=1(xi ¡ ¹ x)2
n ¡ 1
;
where ¹ x = 1
n
Pn
i=1 xi. We are interested in the standard deviation in this context
because it literally indicates the di®erences among the three methods' contributions
(the bigger it is, the more likely a method is to dominate in the marketplace). In this
case, we choose the second deviation (15.28 with respect to user \2") as the criterion
to di®erentiate whether or not domination occurs. This is because, with respect to a
speci¯c user, if the deviation is bigger than or equal to this value, there must be one
constituent recommender that contributes 2.5 times (see the second item in Table 6.5)
more output contributions than (or as many as) another. This, we feel, is a quanti¯ed
view of dominance.
In Table 6.5, the ¯rst column shows the (anonymized) identity of the users. The sec-
ond, third and fourth columns show, in percentage terms, the di®erent constituent rec-
ommender's output contributions to each user. The last column shows the standard
deviation of the three recommenders' contributions. From this, we can see that there
are twenty-four user trials where no one method dominates, three trials dominated by
the content-based recommender, and two trials dominated by the collaborative and the
demographic recommenders respectively (visually depicted in Figure 6.5). This means
that in most cases (77.42%) all three constituent recommenders make signi¯cant output
contributions. From this, we conclude that the auction and reward mechanisms we have
designed do not encourage domination in the marketplace.
The above analysis is based on individual users. However, we can also evaluate the over-
all contributions of the di®erent recommenders to all users. This is important because
it gives us an insight into the di®erence among the overall contributions of di®erent rec-
ommenders. When we add up each individual recommender's output contributions to
all users, they contribute 35.1% (content-based), 30.8% (collaborative) and 34.1% (de-
mographic) of the recommendations displayed to the users respectively (see Figure 6.6).
This indicates that, broadly speaking, each of the three constituent recommenders con-
tribute about the same number of output contributions to the users. Again, this result
shows that the marketplace is not biased towards any speci¯c method.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 115
Table 6.5: Di®erent constituent recommenders' Output Contributions
User
ID
Content-Based
Recommender's
Output
Contribution
Collaborative
Recommender's
Output
Contribution
Demographic
Recommender's
Output
Contribution
Standard
Deviation of
Three
Contributions
1 72 F 20 8 34.02
2 50 F 20 30 15.28
3 37.14 14.29 48.57 F 17.46
4 28 53.33 F 18.67 17.93
5 32 26.67 41.33 7.42
6 25.34 29.33 45.33 10.58
7 36 26.67 37.33 5.81
8 20 33.33 46.67 13.34
9 32 48 20 14.05
10 41.33 30.67 28 7.05
11 40.69 28.28 31.03 6.52
12 32 25.33 42.67 8.75
13 23.81 35.24 40.95 8.73
14 33.33 29.34 37.33 4.0
15 45.33 30.67 24 10.91
16 28 28 44 9.24
17 44 28 28 9.24
18 33.33 29.34 37.33 4.0
19 40 29.33 30.67 5.81
20 20 62.67 F 17.33 25.44
21 32 33.33 34.67 1.34
22 22.67 30.67 46.66 12.22
23 22.67 40 37.33 9.33
24 40 22.67 37.33 9.33
25 54.67 F 17.33 28 19.23
26 41.33 32 26.67 7.42
27 22.67 38.67 38.67 9.24
28 29.33 38.67 32 4.81
29 42.67 21.33 36 10.91
30 37.33 8 54.67 F 23.59
31 29.33 44 26.67 9.33
A contribution with a F indicates its domination in the corresponding user trial.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 116
Figure 6.5: Domination in the Marketplace
Figure 6.6: Di®erent Constituent Recommenders' Overall Output Contributions
6.4.2 Market Convergence
In this subsection, we are going to validate market convergence by evaluating the bidding
price deviations from the equilibria de¯ned in section 6.1 (Equation 6.1). To this end, we
collected the results of the thirty-one user trials and plotted all price deviation points over
auction rounds for each upq level with respect to each user. For example, Figure 6.7(a)
depicts the price deviation points over ¯fteen auctions for the upq level of \1" with
respect to user \22". In this ¯gure, the x-axis represents the ¯fteen consecutive auctions
and the y-axis represents the value of the price deviation from equilibrium. As can beChapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 117
seen, there are nine auctions with recommendations rated at level \1" by this user and
their price deviations from the corresponding equilibrium ¹ P1 (110) are comparatively
small. Then, when we overlay a linear trend line over these deviation points: we get a
line of y = 1:99x+3:22 (all such coe±cients for each upq level with respect to each user
are summarized in Table 6.6). From the ¯gure, we can see that the linear trend line with
a large positive coe±cient tends to increase as the auction rounds increase. For another
example, Figure 6.7(b) depicts the price deviation points for the upq level of \4" for the
same user. As can be seen, its linear trend line with a big negative coe±cient tends to
decrease as the auction rounds increase. For yet another example, Figure 6.7(c) depicts
the price deviation points for the upq level of \3" for user \3". In this case, the linear
trend line has a small negative coe±cient (-0.58) which means that it is hard to judge
the tendency to increase or decrease for this upq level for this user.
Based on the thirty-one user-trials, we ¯nd that all trend lines with a big positive
deviation coe±cient (larger than 0.58) tend to increase as the auction rounds increase,
all those with a big negative deviation coe±cient (smaller than -0.58) tend to decrease,
and all those with a very small deviation coe±cient's absolute value (between -0.58 and
0.58) do not have a clear tendency to increase or decrease. Based on this, we de¯ne that
any trend line that has a positive deviation coe±cient larger than 0.58 diverges; that has
a negative coe±cient smaller than -0.58 converges, and that has a coe±cient's absolute
value smaller than 0.58 is unclear of convergence or divergence. With this de¯nition
in place, Table 6.7 details the convergence for each upq level for each user (based on
Table 6.6).
Based on this individual data, we are now in a position to evaluate how the system
performs in terms of convergence for the user trial population. From Table 6.7, it can
be seen that the price deviations of the top e®ective rating levels9 for most of the users
tend to converge and the price deviations of the lowest e®ective rating levels for most
of the users tend to diverge. Speci¯cally, if we exclude the rating levels where there
are an insu±cient number of deviation points, there are twenty-eight users that have
their top rating level's deviation points converge and three users where it is unclear
(see Figure 6.8). This shows that in almost all cases the recommender agents can learn
9For example, in Table 6.7, upq of 4 is considered the top rating of user \3" since there are insu±cient
data in his rating level of 5. Likewise, upq of 2 is the lowest e®ective rating level for this user since there
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(a) Divergent Example (Deviations from Equilibrium of upq level \1" for User \22")
(b) Convergent Example (Deviations from Equilibrium of upq level \4" for User \22")
(c) Unclear Example (Deviations from Equilibrium of upq level \3" for User \3")
Figure 6.7: Examples of Linear Trend Line of Deviations from EquilibriaChapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 119
Table 6.6: Table of Deviations from Equilibria
User
ID
Deviation
Coe±cient
of UPQ=1
Deviation
Coe±cient
of UPQ=2
Deviation
Coe±cient
of UPQ=3
Deviation
Coe±cient
of UPQ=4
Deviation
Coe±cient
of UPQ=5
1 i * 2.2431 1.4725 1.16 -0.0758
2 1.1846 i -0.482 1.0163 -0.1799
3 i -0.7188 -0.5793 -0.8951 i
4 1.3584 0.6709 -1.0621 -1.1711 -1.2193
5 i 1.8647 0.0251 -1.4178 i
6 2.4336 1.429 -0.3855 -1.8994 i
7 1.9331 1.8553 0.0322 -2.6029 -2.162
8 -0.8877 i i i i
9 2.3799 2.0587 0.1701 -1.3394 -2.0863
10 1.9146 1.4524 -0.2918 i i
11 -0.8575 0.0711 i i -1.1789
12 2.0133 1.4123 0.4087 -1.9071 -2.2316
13 1.5394 1.2418 -0.9607 -1.0426 i
14 2.4343 1.2828 0.6611 -1.1131 -2.1542
15 1.466 0.6606 -1.6457 -1.0571 -1.8371
16 1.0512 -0.0168 -0.8276 i i
17 1.6033 -1.6873 -1.6588 -3.4476 i
18 2.1997 1.1581 0.359 -1.6291 -2.1904
19 2.0186 1.814 0.5971 -1.2874 i
20 1.9116 1.9783 -0.8311 -1.2845 i
21 2.8543 1.6986 -0.9827 -1.5299 -2.5208
22 1.9912 1.296 -0.2344 -1.8763 -1.8136
23 i 1.5569 i i -2.1535
24 1.4248 1.0002 -0.9642 -0.8143 -1.2109
25 1.3664 1.0361 -1.0033 -1.5027 -1.6487
26 i 2.321 -0.3399 -1.695 -2.3186
27 2.2501 1.8482 0.3385 -2.4102 -2.0388
28 i 1.4562 -0.5451 -1.9798 -1.5968
29 i 1.7507 0.1352 -1.5527 -2.9792
30 2.2777 1.3224 -0.0797 -1.5096 -1.9212
31 1.5925 0.9022 -0.6588 -2.1787 -2.1907
* \i" indicates that there are insu±cient deviation points (less than four) to judge converge/diverge.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 120
Table 6.7: Table of Convergence
User
ID
Convergence
of UPQ=1
Convergence
of UPQ=2
Convergence
of UPQ=3
Convergence
of UPQ=4
Convergence
of UPQ=5
1 i d d d u
2 d i u d u
3 i c u c i
4 d d c c c
5 i d u c i
6 d d u c i
7 d d u c c
8 c i i i i
9 d d u c c
10 d d u i i
11 c u i i c
12 d d u c c
13 d d c c i
14 d d d c c
15 d d c c c
16 d u c i i
17 d c c c i
18 d d u c c
19 d d d c i
20 d d c c i
21 d d c c c
22 d d u c c
23 i d i i c
24 d d c c c
25 d d c c c
26 i d u c c
27 d d u c c
28 i d u c c
29 i d u c c
30 d d u c c
31 d d c c c
\i" indicates that there are insu±cient deviation points to judge converge/diverge, \c" represents conver-
gence, \d" represents divergence and \u" indicates it is unclear whether there is convergence/divergence.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 121
Figure 6.8: Convergence of Highest upq (excluding unclear levels) Price Deviations
Figure 6.9: Convergence of Lowest upq (excluding unclear levels) Price Deviations
users' interests quickly when there are recommendations that are highly rated by users.
In such cases, the agents receive large rewards and are able to be con¯dent about their
recommendations. When evaluating the lowest rating level, again excluding those cases
where there are insu±cient deviation points, we ¯nd that there are twenty-eight users
that have their lowest rating level's deviation points diverge and three users where it is
unclear (see Figure 6.9). This pattern is observed because the recommender agents learn
users' interests slowly when the recommendations are lowly rated by users (since theyChapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 122
are more uncertain about such recommendations because they receive a small amount of
reward). This divergence is symptomatic of the fact that at these low rating levels the
recommender agents are still iterating their bids to chase the corresponding equilibrium
(according to the bidding strategy introduced in Table 3.1). However, the deviation
cannot diverge to very large values in this case. This is because, on the one hand,
recommendations with very high bid prices compared to the corresponding equilibria
will receive no rewards and the corresponding greedy bidders will go bankrupt (see
section 4.2.5). While, on the other hand, recommendations with very low bid prices
compared to the corresponding equilibria cannot be shortlisted and they will try to
increase their bid prices in later auctions (see section 3.4). This dual e®ect makes
the price deviations of low upq levels uncertain in a small number of recommending
rounds: they might converge after some further auctions or they might not (if the
recommender agents cannot learn the users' interests with respect to the moderately
interesting recommendations).
In sum then, these experiments show the marketplace tends to converge quickly over
the recommendations with high user ratings because of the clear incentives associated
with the users' interests. However, the marketplace is uncertain about convergence over
the recommendations with low user ratings because of weak or unclear incentives. This
does not mean that our marketplace does not work in this case. However, to e®ectively
correlate the constituent recommenders' bids to the qualities of the recommendations
with low user ratings is subject to a few other issues, such as:
² long learning time. A long learning period enables the constituent recommenders
to have more information to learn users' interests so as to be certain about the
moderately interesting items;
² good learning e®ectiveness. A good learning capability enables the constituent rec-
ommenders to achieve learning convergence quickly and this a®ects their bidding;
and
² long training process. All kinds of recommender system need a training process to
learn users' interests [Middleton et al., 2004]. However, our system is somewhat
weak in such process and the constituent recommenders are uncertain about the
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However, these issues are beyond the scope of this work (see the discussions in Chapter 7
where some thoughts on addressing these issues are given).
6.4.3 E®ective Peak Performance
To evaluate whether our market-based recommender's peak performance is indeed above
that of all the constituent recommenders', we recorded their peak performance points
for all users over all auction rounds. For example, Figure 6.10 shows the marketplace's
e®ective peak performance points versus those of the three constituent recommenders
with respect to user \5". From Figure 6.10, we can see that the market-based recom-
mender's e®ective peak performance points are at the ¯rst, third, fourth, ¯fth, sixth,
seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, fourteenth and ¯fteenth auction rounds. From
this, it is apparent that the marketplace's peak performance is, in most cases, above or
equal to the best of the three constituent recommenders'.
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Figure 6.10: Di®erent Recommenders' Peak Performances
Now we need to determine whether this happens for most of the users. To do this, we
added up all the e®ective peak performance points for all thirty-one user trials. Among
all the auctions for all users, 66.4% of them have their market-based recommender's peak
performance as high as the best of the three constituent recommenders' (see Figure 6.11).Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 124
Figure 6.11: Marketplace's Overall E®ective Peak Performance
6.4.4 Best Recommendations Identi¯cation
After evaluating the above three market related properties of our system, we now seek
to determine whether our system is indeed suggesting those documents that the user
values most. To do this, we randomly selected a few users to evaluate this property10.
With respect to a given user, a number (Num) of recommendations are made available
for recommendation. Here, Num is bigger than 75 (5 recommendations per auction
multiplied by 15 auctions, for a typical user's task) so that the system can make its
recommendations from a big pool of items from all quality levels. With respect to
a speci¯c user, Num recommendations can be divided into two sets: one with items
suggested by the system to the user and the other with items omitted by the system
during the user's task (i.e. not presented in any auction round in the trial for that
user). Then, to identify the best items for this user, we require him to perform a trial
(as we have outline previously) and, additionally, to rate all the omitted items. This
means, we can manually identify the best recommendations for the user (de¯ned in the
fourth metric in section 6.1). From this, we are able to validate how many of the best
recommendations our system is able to identify.
In more detail, Figure 6.12 shows a typical example of these experiments. Here, the
horizontal axis represents the di®erent rating levels and the vertical axis represents
10This is a time-consuming task since it involves examining a huge number of Web documents from
the source recommendation pool and rating each of them. Therefore, we performed this with a subset
of our user trial population. Speci¯cally, we did it for one randomly selected user.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 125
Figure 6.12: Available Recommendations vs Actual Recommended Items
the number of recommendations. The white bars represent the numbers of available
recommendations (made available to recommend before the user performs the task) at
each of the di®erent rating levels. The light gray bars represent the numbers of items
actually suggested by our system from the ¯rst to the ¯fth recommending round of the
user's task. The dark gray bars represent the numbers of items actually suggested from
the sixth to the tenth recommending round. The black bars represent those suggested
from the eleventh to the ¯fteenth round. The white bars in Figure 6.12 show that
there are 18 recommendations (¯fteen items with rating \4" and three with \5") that
this user considers best. From Figure 6.12, we can see that the numbers of the best
recommendations have an overall tendency to increase over the recommending rounds.
This indicates that our marketplace is able to e®ectively learn the user's interests and
identify the best recommendations more frequently over time. From the numbers of
recommendations made at rating levels \0" and \1", we can see that our marketplace is
able to deliberately deter such bad and weakly positive recommendations because the
numbers of such recommendations have an overall tendency to decrease over time.
During the user's trial from the ¯rst to the ¯fth recommending round, we ¯nd that there
are four quali¯ed recommending rounds and one of them is a satis¯ed recommendingChapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 126
Figure 6.13: Best Recommendations Identi¯cation for a Given User
round (see the de¯nitions in the fourth metric in section 6.1); from the sixth to the tenth
round, there are three quali¯ed rounds and two of them are satis¯ed; from the eleventh
to the ¯fteenth round, there are ¯ve quali¯ed rounds and four of them are satis¯ed.
These results are displayed in Figure 6.13. This means that 80% of the ¯rst ¯ve rounds,
66.7% of the second ¯ve rounds and 100% of the last ¯ve rounds are quali¯ed, whereas
20% of the ¯rst ¯ve rounds, 40% of the second ¯ve rounds and 80% of the last ¯ve rounds
are satis¯ed. Therefore, both the quali¯ed and the satis¯ed recommending rounds have
the overall tendency of increasing. When taken together, these results show that our
marketplace is indeed able to identify the best recommendations and display them in
the top positions of the recommendation sidebar quickly and frequently.
6.5 Summary
This chapter presents the user evaluation of our market-based recommender system.
Speci¯cally, we validated and veri¯ed the feasibility and e±ciency of our market-based
approach to recommender systems through thirty-one user trials. Based on our exper-
iments with these real users, we conclude that our market-based recommender system
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² Our marketplace is able to coordinate multiple recommenders and guarantee they
have equal opportunities to display their recommendations to users. Compared
to the fairness de¯ned in section 3.1 and evaluated in section 4.2.4, the identi-
cal output contribution again reinforces the fairness property of the marketplace.
With the simulations in section 4.2.4, it is hard to assert fairness with respect to
di®erent users' interests and browsing contexts. However, the evaluations on iden-
tical output contribution demonstrate that our marketplace is able to act fairly to
di®erent constituent recommenders across a user population of di®erent interests
and browsing contexts in a real environment.
² The market converges quickly with respect to highly rated recommendations since
there are clear incentives associated with these items. The evaluations on mar-
ket convergence directly evaluate the bidding price deviations from corresponding
equilibria of di®erent upq levels. This is based on the fact that we have demon-
strated, in section 4.2.1, that as prices for di®erent advertisement slots converge,
prices for recommendations of di®erent upq levels also converge. In this chap-
ter, we successfully demonstrated the convergence of recommendations with high
upqs, while we observe a lack of convergence of low upq recommendations.
Additionally, the price convergence for di®erent upq levels also indicates the mar-
ketplace's ability to correlate the recommendations' upqs to the constituent rec-
ommenders' inqs. This is because after the high upqs prices convergence, the
individual recommenders have built up their internal correlations between the
prices and the corresponding upqs, as well as to their inqs (this relationship has
been demonstrated in section 4.2.3). Thus, the correlations between these upqs
and their corresponding inqs have been built up.
² After convergence, the market-based recommender's peak performance is above or
equal to the best of all three constituent recommenders' most of the time. This
means that our marketplace is able to work as a coordinator of multiple di®erent
recommenders and always output the best items from whatever of these constituent
recommenders. This is the original objective of our market-based approach to
recommendations as stated in section 1.1.Chapter 6 User Evaluations of the Recommender System 128
² Our market-based recommender is able to identify the best items most of the time
and, in general, these are displayed in the top positions of the recommendation
side bar. This is again precisely the objective of our market-based approach that
is stated in section 1.1.
To conclude, this chapter contributes to the thesis in the following ways: (i) this chapter
built up a real market-based recommender system and evaluated our market mechanism
design from chapters 3, 4 and 5 with real users; (ii) the evaluation results show that our
marketplace works as an e®ective coordinator of multiple recommendation methods and
gives fairness to all constituent recommenders without any one dominating the market-
place across the user population; (iii) the evaluation results show that the marketplace
always converges with respect to the recommendations that highly interest the users.
Additionally, this indicates the marketplace is able to correlate such recommendations'
upqs and inqs; and (iv) the marketplace works e®ectively and is able to quickly and
frequently seek out the best items from all constituent recommenders and display them
at the top positions of the recommendation side bar to the users in most cases. In sum-
mary, the user evaluations of the real market-based recommender demonstrates that our
market-based approach is an e®ective means of coordinating multiple di®erent recom-
mendation methods in one single system and that it is an e®ective way of dealing with
the problem of information overload.Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Information overload on the Web is an ever-growing problem and recommender systems
have been widely advocated as a tool that can help in this context. Given this, there are
many recommendation methods being developed to assist recommendations. However,
there is no one that is able to e®ectively make recommendations for all users with various
interests. Thus, we believe that the way to go in this area is to develop an overarching
system that incorporates multiple recommendation methods and that lets only the best
items from whatever methods pass through to the user.
Following this philosophy, in this work, a market-based approach is used to coordinate
multiple recommendation methods. Here a market-based recommender is a system that
uses an economic marketplace to let multiple recommenders compete with each other
to o®er their recommendations. By so doing, the marketplace automates the coordina-
tion of this competition and the process of selecting the best items from the viewpoint
of users. Such a system is designed to be used in conjunction with traditional rec-
ommendation methods (such as content-based, collaborative, demographic and hybrid
¯ltering techniques). In particular, the market-based recommender system is e®ectively
a meta-recommender that selects only the best items from whatever sources to display
to users.
129Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 130
7.1 Conclusions
The central hypotheses of this thesis is that a market-based approach is a good means
of coordinating multiple recommendation methods and letting only the best items pass
through to the user. In order to prove this hypotheses, three sub-hypotheses are estab-
lished and evaluated.
The ¯rst sub-hypotheses is that all the constituent recommenders incorporated in the
marketplace work in a broadly similar manner and that in gross terms they contribute
a similar number of recommendations across various user interests. This property en-
sures there is su±cient competition between the various recommendation methods and
that the market-based recommender does not degenerate to a single constituent recom-
mendation method. To this end, simulation results in section 4.2.4 show that di®erent
methods do indeed contribute a similar number of recommendations to users without
considering users' interests and browsing contexts. This is the ¯rst attempt to prove
the ¯rst sub-hypotheses. Building on this, section 6.4.1 then uses real users' evaluations
to support this sub-hypotheses and the evaluation results demonstrate that our market-
place does give di®erent constituent recommenders an equal opportunity of displaying
their recommendations across a user population with various interests and browsing
contexts.
The second sub-hypotheses is that the market is always able to converge so that it
is able to give clear incentives of the upqs of recommendations to the recommender
agents. To this end, sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 demonstrate that the market converges to
di®erent equilibria with respect to di®erent advertisement side bar slots. In addition, to
evaluate the convergence of economical equilibria (a point where supply crosses demand)
of advertisement slots, section 6.4.2 looks into the bidding price convergence with respect
to di®erent upqs of recommendations and shows that the market does indeed converge
with respect to high upq recommendations. With the market convergence in place,
a constituent recommender agent is able to reason about the amount of reward and
the bidding price it is likely to receive and should bid over the recommendations with
certain inqs. After the market converges, the rewards an agent receives re°ect the upqs
of its recommendations, whereas the optimally adjusted bidding prices re°ect the valueChapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 131
of advertising these items. In this way, the market correlates the recommenders' inqs
to the upqs of their recommendations.
The third sub-hypotheses is that the marketplace quickly and frequently identi¯es the
best recommendations to the users. To this end, section 4.4 attempts to validate the
marketplace's ability to identify the best recommendations. To improve the e±ciency of
this identi¯cation ability, chapter 5 describes a reinforcement learning strategy to assist
the agent to make the best recommendations quickly and frequently. The simulations
in chapter 5 do indeed show that a marketplace with learning agents is able to ¯nd
out the best items more quickly and more frequently than one without. Moreover,
armed with three kinds of traditional ¯ltering agents with our learning capability, the
user evaluations of the real market-based recommender system in sections 6.4.3 and
6.4.4 help demonstrate this sub-hypotheses from two perspectives. The evaluations in
section 6.4.3 show from the marketplace's internal point of view, the way in which the
market-based recommender is always able to perform as good as the best constituent
recommender. In contrast, the evaluations in section 6.4.4 show, from the users' point
of view, that the marketplace is indeed able to quickly and frequently identify the top
upq recommendations and display them in the top position of the recommendation side
bar.
Taking the evidence shown by the experiments we carried out in chapters 4, 5 and 6
against the market-based mechanism designed in chapter 3, we are now in a position
to conclude that the market-based approach to recommender systems is indeed a very
e®ective means of coordinating multiple di®erent recommendation methods in one single
system and that it is a very e®ective way of dealing with the problem of information
overload by selecting only the best items from whatever methods to be displayed to
users. In other words, the market-based approach to recommender systems is neither
a new recommendation algorithm, nor a new ¯ltering technique, but rather it is a new
paradigm for economic-oriented approaches to recommendations.
7.2 Future Work
Despite the success of the system we have developed, there are a number of ways in
which it can be improved still further. Given this, we outline the main direction ofChapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 132
future work.
7.2.1 Improving the Speed of Market Convergence
As can be seen from the experiments demonstrated in chapters 4, 5 and 6, market
convergence is the backbone that makes the marketplace work in terms of recommending
e®ectively. If a marketplace fails to converge, it is unable to give incentives of upqs of
recommendations to the constituent recommenders, the constituent recommenders are
unable to learn the users' interests, nor are they able to correlate their bidding prices to
the upqs and the inqs of their recommendations.
Therefore, it is important to develop methods and techniques that can be developed in
the marketplace in order to speed up convergence. Such methods enable a market-based
recommender to quickly give clear incentives to the constituent recommender agents and
enables the agents to learn the users' interests quickly. However, except for validating the
suitability and e®ectiveness of using market-based mechanisms as means of coordinating
multiple recommendation methods, this thesis did little on developing techniques to im-
prove the speed of market convergence. In more detail, our simulations in chapter 4 aim
to assert the suitability of our system for an environment with full competition (mean-
ing with a large number of constituent recommenders and source recommendations).
However, the comparatively large number of price iterations (because of a large degree
of competition) make the convergence slow. To kick start the convergence, the experi-
ments in chapter 6 use constant equilibria instead of ¯nding the equilibria of historical
average prices by the marketplace itself. This approach makes convergence quicker and
quickly di®erentiates recommendations in terms of upqs by their corresponding prices.
However, it is rigid to equilibria prices since with di®erent system con¯gurations the
equilibria tend to change and we do not know this change.
Therefore, a future direction of work in this area is to improve the degree of automation
of ¯nding the market convergence across di®erent system con¯gurations such as the
number of constituent recommenders, the number of upq levels and the number of
shortlisted recommendations to be displayed to the users at a time. Relevant methods
that could be considered in this context include the principles of supply and demand
(i.e. the market equilibrium) [Varian, 2003].Chapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 133
7.2.2 Dealing with Dynamically Changing User Interests
This thesis deals with information overload in a static user environment (meaning that
the user does not change his browsing interest and context while interacting with the
system). However, in more general cases, a user may have multiple, di®erent topics of
interest such as music, fashion and food. Furthermore, a user's interest topic within a
broad area may change from one sub-area to another, such as from classical music to pop
music, from spring fashion to summer fashion, and from Italian to French food. In some
even more complex environments, a user may have multiple parallel browsing sessions on
di®erent topics. Now all these issues undoubtedly make it more di±cult for the market-
based mechanism (and all other mechanisms) to suggest as good recommendations as
those it makes in a static user environment. To deal with this, techniques such as user
interest pro¯le management [Case et al., 2003, 2001] and Bayesian decision theory [Duda
et al., 2000] are potential candidates because the former provides a means of managing
users interests when they have multiple interesting topics and the latter provides the
con¯dence for recommenders to detect the status of the changing user interest.
7.2.3 Improving the Sharing of Information
When learning the users' interests and making recommendations, each constituent rec-
ommender needs to collect a large amount of data such as the users' topics of interest and
the Web documents' keywords. From the overall system's point of view, this collection
process can be highly repetitive since the di®erent recommenders cover large amounts of
collected data. Such duplication also unavoidably damages the computational e±ciency
of the individual recommenders and the overall system. Therefore, providing a means of
sharing such information between the di®erent constituent recommenders will undoubt-
edly save computational resources and improve computational e±ciency. However, the
kind of information that can be should be shared among the di®erent recommenders
and di®erent users has privacy implications. This is because users may not be willing to
share their private information with others and, on the other hand, the self-interested
recommender agents may not be willing to share their knowledge with others since they
work in a competitive manner and their knowledge a®ects their pro¯ts directly. There-
fore, providing a means of information sharing to improve the system's computationalChapter 7 Conclusions and Future Work 134
e±ciency, while not destroying privacy among the users and among the constituent rec-
ommenders is an interesting potential future research topic. Here promising work can
be found in [Lau et al., 1999].
7.2.4 Improving the Degree of Personalization
Personalization plays an important role in dealing with information overload. Generally
speaking, in our context, personalization is the adoption and arrangement of information
that is tailored to a single user or a group of users. This is, therefore, undoubtedly a
research issue for market-based recommender systems. However, while we described
the big picture of the general issues of the market-based approach, we did little in this
aspect. In this context, there are two aspects of personalization research that come
to the fore: (i) the individual constituent recommendation methods' personalization
and (ii) the marketplace's personalization. The former has been extensively studied in
traditional recommender system research (e.g. [Sheth and Maes, 1993, Mladenic, 1996,
Zuno, 1997, Lynch, 2001]) and is an ongoing line of enquiry. However, the latter needs
further investigation and should focus on issues related to improving the speed of market
convergence, information sharing and security issues.Bibliography
Autonomy. Agentware i3. Technical report, Autonomy, Inc., 301 University Avenue,
Suite 200 Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA, 1997.
Paul E. Baclace. Personal information intake ¯ltering. In Proceedings of the Bellcore
Information Filtering Workshop, Nov. 1991.
Marko Balabanovic and Yoav Shoham. Fab: Content-based, collaborative recommenda-
tion. Communications of the ACM, 40(3):66{72, 1997.
Nicholas J. Belkin and W. Bruce Croft. Information ¯ltering and information retrieval:
two sides of the same coin? Communications of the ACM, 35(12):29{38, 1992. ISSN
0001-0782.
T. Berners-Lee, R. Cailliau, T.-F. Gro®, and B. Pollermann. World-wide web: The
information universe. Electronic Networking: Research, Applications, and Policy, 1
(2):52{58, 1992.
D. A. Berry and B. Fristedt. Bandit Problems: Sequential Allocation of Experiments.
Chapman and Hall, London, 1985.
Daniel Billsus and Michael J. Pazzani. Learning collaborative information ¯lters. In
Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Machine Learning, pages
46{54. Morgan Kaufmann, 1998.
Daniel Billsus and Michael J. Pazzani. User modeling for adaptive news access. User
Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 10(2-3):147{180, 2000. ISSN 0924-1868.
Sander M. Bohte, Enrico Gerding, and Han La Poutr¶ e. Competitive market-based
allocation of consumer attention space. In Proceedings of the Thirdrd ACM Conference
on Electronic Commerce, pages 202{205, Tampa, USA, 2001. ISBN 1-58113-387-1.
135BIBLIOGRAPHY 136
Sander M. Bohte, Enrico Gerding, and Han La Poutr¶ e. Market-based recommenda-
tion: Agents that compete for consumer attention. ACM Transactions on Internet
Technology, 4(4):420{448, 2004.
John S. Breese, David Heckerman, and Carl Kadie. Empirical analysis of predictive algo-
rithms for collaborative ¯ltering. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Conference
on Uncertainty in Arti¯cial Intelligence, pages 43{52, Wisconsin, USA, 1998.
Robin Burke. Hybrid recommender systems: Survey and experiments. User Modeling
and User-Adapted Interaction, 12(4):331{370, 2002. ISSN 0924-1868.
Simon Case, Nader Azarmi, Marcus Thint, and Takeshi Ohtani. Enhancing e-
communities with agent-based systems. IEEE Computer, 34(7):64{69, 2001. ISSN
0018-9162. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/2.933505.
Simon Case, Marcus Thint, Takeshi Ohtani, and Stephen Hare. Personalisation and web
communities. BT Technology Journal, 21(1):91{97, Jan 2003.
Mark Claypool, Anuja Gokhale, Tim Miranda, Pavel Murnikov, Dmitry Netes, and
Matthew Sartin. Combining content-based and collaborative ¯lters in an online news-
paper. In ACM SIGIR Workshop on Recommender Systems, Berkeley, US, 1999.
Scott H. Clearwater, editor. Market-Based Control: A Paradigm for Distributed Resource
Allocation. World Scienti¯c Publishing, 1996.
R. K. Dash, D. C. Parkes, and N. R. Jennings. Computational mechanism design: A
call to arms. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 18(6):40{47, 2003.
David C. DeRoure, Wendy Hall, Siegfried Reich, Aggelos Pikrakis, Gary J. Hill, and
Mark Stairmand. Memoir { an open framework for enhanced navigation of distributed
information. Information Processing and Management, 37:53{74, 2001.
Richard O. Duda, Peter E. Hart, and David G. Stork. Pattern Classi¯cation. Wiley,
2000. ISBN 0471056693.
Samhaa R. El-Beltagy, Wendy Hall, David DeRoure, and Leslie Carr. Linking in context.
In Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Conference on Hypertext and Hypermedia, pages
151{160, Denmark, 2001. ISBN 1-59113-420-7.BIBLIOGRAPHY 137
J. C. Gittins. Multi-Armed Bandit Allocation Indices. Wiley, 1989.
D. Goldberg, D. Nichols, B.M. Oki, and D. Terry. Using collaborative ¯ltering to weave
an information tapestry. Communications of the ACM, 35(12):61{70, 1992.
Gustavo Gonzalez, Beatriz Lopez, and Josep Lluis de la Rosa. Managing emotions in
smart user models for recommender systems. In Seventeenth of Sixth International
Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, pages 187{194, 2004.
Jonathan L. Herlocker, Joseph A. Konstan, and John Riedl. Explaining collaborative
¯ltering recommendations. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Computer supported
cooperative work, pages 241{250, Philadelphia, US, 2000. ISBN 1-58113-222-0. doi:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/358916.358995.
Jonathan L. Herlocker, Joseph A. Konstan, Loren G. Terveen, and John T. Riedl. Evalu-
ating collaborative ¯ltering recommender systems. ACM Transactions on Information
System, 22(1):5{53, 2004. ISSN 1046-8188. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/963770.
963772.
Will Hill, Larry Stead, Mark Rosenstein, and George Furnas. Recommending and eval-
uating choices in a virtual community of use. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI'95, pages 194{201, 1995.
Adele E. Howe and Daniel Dreilinger. Savvysearch: A meta-search engine that learns
which search engines to query. AI Magazine, 18(2):19{25, 1997.
N. R. Jennings, P. Faratin, A. R. Lomuscio, S. Parsons, C. Sierra, and M. Wooldridge.
Automated negotiation: Prospects, methods and challenges. Journal of Group Deci-
sion and Negotiation, 10(2):199{215, 2001.
Nicholas R. Jennings. An agent-based approach for building complex software systems.
Communications of the ACM, 44(4):35{41, 2001.
Nicholas R. Jennings and Michael J. Wooldridge, editors. Agent Technology: Founda-
tions, Applications, and Markets. Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1998. ISBN 3-540-63591-2.
Leslie Pack Kaelbling. Learning in Embedded Systems. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993.
Leslie Pack Kaelbling, Michael L. Littman, and Andrew W. Moore. Reinforcement
learning: A survey. Journal of Arti¯cial Intelligence Research, 4:237{285, 1996.BIBLIOGRAPHY 138
John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, editors. The Hand Book of Experimental Economics.
Princeton University Press, 1995.
B. Kahle and B. Gilliat. Alexa - navigate the web smarter, faster, easier. Technical
report, Alexa Internet, Presidio of San Fransisco, CA, 1997.
Grigoris J. Karakoulas and Innes A. Ferguson. Sigma: Integrating learning techniques
in computational markets for information ¯ltering. In AAAI 1996 Spring Symposium
on Machine Learning in Information Access, Stanford, CA, 1996.
Paul Klemperer. Auction theory: A guide to literature. Journal of Economic Surveys,
13(3):227{286, 1999.
Joseph A. Konstan, Bradley N. Miller, David Maltz, Jonathan L. Herlocker, Lee R.
Gordon, and John Riedl. Grouplens: applying collaborative ¯ltering to usenet news.
Communications of the ACM, 40(3):77{87, 1997. ISSN 0001-0782.
Ivan Koychev. Gradual forgetting for adaptation to concept drift. In Proceedings of
ECAI2000 Workshop Current Issues in Spatio-Temporal Reasoning, pages 101{106,
Berlin, 2000.
B. Krulwich. Lifestyle ¯nder: Intelligent user pro¯ling using large-scale demographic
data. AI Magazine, 18(2):37{45, 1997.
Ken Lang. NewsWeeder: learning to ¯lter netnews. In Proceedings of the Twelfth
International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 331{339, San Mateo, US, 1995.
Morgan Kaufmann publishers.
Tessa Lau, Oren Etzioni, and Daniel S. Weld. Privacy interfaces for information man-
agement. Communications of ACM, 42(10):88{94, 1999. ISSN 0001-0782. doi:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/317665.317680.
Alon Y. Levy, Anand Rajaraman, and Joann J. Ordille. Querying heterogeneous in-
formation sources using source descriptions. In Proceedings of the Twenty-second
International Conference on Very Large Databases, pages 251{262, Bombay, India,
1996. VLDB Endowment, Saratoga, Calif.BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
Henry Lieberman. Letizia: An agent that assists web browsing. In Proceedings of the
Fourteenth International Joint Conference on Arti¯cial Intelligence (IJCAI-95), pages
924{929, Montreal, Canada, 1995. ISBN 1-55860-363-8.
Nick Littlestone and Manfred Warmuth. The weighted majority algorithm. Information
and Computation, 108(2):212{261, 1994.
Shoshana Loeb and Douglas Terry. Information ¯ltering. Communications of the ACM,
35(12):26{28, Dec 1992.
Robert M. Losee. Minimizing information overload: The ranking of electronic messages.
Journal of Information Science, 15(3):179{189, 1989.
Cli®ord A. Lynch. Personalization and recommender systems in the larger context: New
directions and research questions. In Second DELOS Network of Excellence Workshop
on Personalisation and Recommender Systems in Digital Libraries, Dublin, Ireland,
2001.
Pattie Maes. Agents that reduce work and information overload. Communications of
the ACM, 37(7):31{40, July 1994.
David Maltz. Distributing information for collaborative ¯ltering on usenet net news.
Thesis Proposal MIT/LCS/TR-603, MIT, Nov 1993.
David Maltz and Kate Ehrlich. Pointing the way: Active collaborative ¯ltering. In Pro-
ceedings of the ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI'95),
pages 202{209, Denver, USA, 1995. ISBN 0-201-84705-1.
R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic
Literature, 25(2):699{738, June 1987.
Stuart E. Middleton, Nigel R. Shadbolt, and David C. De Roure. Ontological user
pro¯ling in recommender systems. ACM Transactions on Information Systems, 22
(1):54{88, 2004. ISSN 1046-8188. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/963770.963773.
Stuart Edward Middleton. Capturing Knowledge of User Preferences with Recommender
Systems. PhD thesis, University of Southampton, May 2003.
Paul Milgrom. Auctions and bidding: A primer. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
3(3):3{22, Summer 1989.BIBLIOGRAPHY 140
Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J. Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.
Econometrica, 50(5):1089{1122, Sep. 1982.
Bradley N. Miller, Istvan Albert, Shyong K. Lam, Joseph A. Konstan, and John
Riedl. Movielens unplugged: experiences with an occasionally connected recom-
mender system. In Proceedings of the Eightth International Conference on Intelli-
gent User Interfaces, pages 263{266. ACM Press, 2003. ISBN 1-58113-586-6. doi:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/604045.604094.
Tom Mitchell. Machine Learning. McGraw Hill, 1997. ISBN 0070428077.
D. Mladenic. Personal webwatcher: Implementation and design. Technical report ijs-
dp-7472, Department of Intelligent Systems. Slovenia: J. Stefan Institute, 1996.
Miquel Montaner, Beatriz Lopez, and Josep Lluis Dela. A taxonomy of recommender
agents on the internet. Arti¯cial Intelligence Review, 19:285{330, 2003.
Luc Moreau, Norliza Zaini, Jing Zhou, Nicholas R. Jennings, Yan Zheng Wei, Wendy
Hall, David De Roure, Ian Gilchrist, Mark O'Dell, Sigi Reich, Tobias Berka, and
Claudia Di Napoli. A market-based recommender system. In Proceedings of the Fourth
International Workshop on Agent-Oriented Information Systems (AOIS-2002), pages
50{67, Bologna, July 2002.
Tracy Mullen and Michael P. Wellman. A simple computational market for network in-
formation services. In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multiagent
Systems, pages 283{289, San Francisco, 1995. AAAI Press / MIT Press.
Michael Pazzani. A framework for collaborative, content-based and demographic ¯lter-
ing. Arti¯cial Intelligence Review, 13(5-6):393{408, 1999. ISSN 0269-2821.
Michael Pazzani, J. Muramatsu, and D. Billsus. Syskill & webert: Indentifying inter-
esting web sites. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth National Conference on Arti¯cial
Intelligence, pages 54{61, 1996.
David M. Pennock, Eric Horvitz, and C. Lee Giles. Social choice theory and recom-
mender systems: Analysis of the axiomatic foundations of collaborative ¯ltering.
In Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Arti¯cial Intelligence andBIBLIOGRAPHY 141
Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Arti¯cial Intelligence, pages 729{
734. AAAI Press / The MIT Press, 2000. ISBN 0-262-51112-6.
Brian Pinkerton. WebCrawler: Finding what people want. PhD thesis, University of
Washington, U.S., 2000.
Alexandrin Popescul, Lyle H. Ungar, David M. Pennock, and Steve Lawrence. Proba-
bilistic models for uni¯ed collaborative and content-based recommendation in sparse-
data environments. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on Uncertainty in
Arti¯cial Intelligence (UAI-2001), pages 437{444, Seattle, US, 2001.
P. Resnick, N. Iacovou, M. Suchak, P. Bergstorm, and J. Riedl. Grouplens: An open
architecture for collaborative ¯ltering of netnews. In Proceedings of ACM 1994 Con-
ference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, pages 175{186, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, 1994.
Paul Resnick and Hal R. Varian. Recommender Systems. Communications of the ACM,
40(3):56{58, 1997.
E. Rich. User modeling via stereotyps. Cognitive Science, 3:329{354, 1979.
Alvin E. Roth. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimental economics and
computation as tools of design economics. Econometrica, 70(4):1341{1378, 2002.
Gerard Salton. Automatic Text Processing: The Transformation, Analysis, and Retrieval
of Information by Computer. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1989. ISBN
0-201-12227-8.
Gerard Salton and M. McGill. Introduction to Modern Information Retrieval. McGraw-
Hill Publishing Company, New York, 1983.
Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus. Economics. McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 17th
edition, 2001.
Tuomas W. Sandholm. Distributed rational decision making. In Gerhard Weiss, editor,
Multiagent Systems: A Modern Approach to Distributed Arti¯cial Intelligence, pages
201{258. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1999.BIBLIOGRAPHY 142
Badrul M. Sarwar, George Karypis, Joseph A. Konstan, and John Riedl. Analysis
of recommendation algorithms for e-commerce. In ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, pages 158{167, 2000.
Badrul M. Sarwar, Joseph A. Konstan, Al Borchers, John Herlocker, Brad Miller, and
John Riedl. Using ¯ltering agents to improve prediction quality in the grouplens
research collaborative ¯ltering system. In Proceedings of the 1998 ACM Conference
on Computer supported cooperative work, pages 345{354, Seattle, US, 1998. ISBN
1-58113-009-0.
Upendra Shardanand and Pattie Maes. Social information ¯ltering: algorithms for
automating \word of mout". In Proceedings of Conference on Human factors in com-
puting systems, pages 210{217. ACM Press, 1995. ISBN 0-201-84705-1.
Rita Sharma and David Poole. Symmetric collaborative ¯ltering using the noisy sensor
model. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on Uncertainty in Arti¯cial
Intelligence (UAI-2001), pages 488{495, Seattle, US, 2001.
Beerud Sheth and Pattie Maes. Evolving agents for personalized information ¯ltering.
In Proceedings of the nineth Conference on Arti¯cial Intelligence for Applications
(CAIA'93), pages 345{352, Orlando, 1993.
L. Terveen and W. Hill. Beyond recommender systems: Helping people help each other.
In J. Carroll, editor, HCI in the New Millennium. Addison Wesley, 2001.
Loren Terveen, Will Hill, Brian Amento, David McDonald, and Josh Creter. PHOAKS:
A system for sharing recommendations. Communications of the ACM, 40(3):59{62,
1997.
Edward L. Thorndike. Animal intelligence: An experimental study of the associative
processes in animals. Psychological Review, Monograph Supplements, (8), 1898. New
York: MacMillan.
S. B. Thrun. The role of exploration in learning control. In D. A. White and D. A.
Sofge, editors, Handbook of Intelligent Control. Van Nostrand, New York, 1992.
Efraim Turban, Jae Lee, David King, and H. Michael Chung. Electronic Commerce: A
Managerial Perspective. Prentice Hall, 2000.BIBLIOGRAPHY 143
Hal R. Varian. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. Norton, 6th edition,
2003.
William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal
of Finance, 16(1):8{37, Mar 1961.
Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Market-based recommendations:
Design, simulation and evaluation. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Work-
shop on Agent-Oriented Information Systems (AOIS-2003), pages 63{78, Melbourne,
Australia, 2003a. Springer LNAI 3030.
Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Recommender systems: A
market-based design. In Proceedings of the Second International Joint Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS03), pages 600{607, Mel-
bourne, Australia, 2003b. ACM Press.
Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Learning users' interests in
a market-based recommender system. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Con-
ference on Intelligent Data Engineering and Automated Learning (IDEAL'04), pages
833{840, Exeter, UK, 2004a. Springer LNCS 3177.
Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Market-based recommender
systems: Learning users' interests by quality classi¯cation. In Proceedings of the Sixth
International Workshop on Agent-Oriented Information Systems (AOIS-2004), pages
119{133, New York, US, 2004b.
Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. Learning users' interests by
quality classi¯cation in market-based recommender systems. IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering, To appeara.
Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, and Nicholas R. Jennings. A market-based approach to
recommender systems. ACM Transactions on Information Systems, To appearb.
Michael P. Wellman and Peter R. Wurman. Market-aware agents for a multiagent world.
Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 24:115{125, 1998.
Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wurman, Kevin O'Malley, Roshan Bangera, Shou-De
Lin, Daniel Reeves, and William E. Walsh. Designing the market game for a tradingBIBLIOGRAPHY 144
agent competition. IEEE Internet Computing, 5(2):43{51, March-April 2001. ISSN
1089-7801. INSPEC Accession Number: 6934076.
Michael J. Wooldridge and Nicholas R. Jennings. Intelligent agents: theory and practice.
The Knowledge Engineering Review, 10(2):115{152, 1995.
T. Yan and H. Garcia-Molina. SIFT|A tool for wide-area information dissemination.
In Proc. 1995 USENIX Technical Conference, pages 177{186, New Orleans, 1995.
Kai Yu, Xiaowei Xu, Martin Ester, and Hans-Peter Kriegel. Selecting relevant instances
for e±cient and accurate collaborative ¯ltering. In Proceedings of the tenth Interna-
tional Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, pages 239{246, At-
lanta, Georgia, USA, 2001. ACM Press. ISBN 1-58113-436-3.
Kai Yu, Xiaowei Xu, Martin Ester, and Hans-Peter Kriegel. Feature weighting and in-
stance selection for collaborative ¯ltering: An information-theoretic approach. Knowl-
edge and Information Systems, 5(2), April 2003.
Gustavo Zamboni. Search tools. Technical report, University of Cordoba, 1998.
Zuno. Vrisko - personal knowledge manager. Technical report, Zuno Limited, 1997.
URL url300 Third Avenue, Waltham, MA 02154.